

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL  
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Strategy

by

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
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## ABSTRACT

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS by MAJ Martin H. Wijnen, Royal Netherlands Army, 161 pages.

Interagency coordination at the national level is required to improve the outcome of an international multiagency operation and to enhance the performance of each of the involved agencies. It should also lead to a more effective use of the instruments of power. That is even more important for the Netherlands, a smaller nation with finite national resources. Stronger interagency coordination within the Netherlands could yield economic benefits and international influence. The central question therefore is: Can Dutch interagency coordination in international affairs be conducted more effectively?

An analysis of American and Dutch interagency efforts demonstrates the similarity between the reasons for the U.S. Government to create mechanisms for interagency coordination and the shortfalls in the Dutch governmental system. This analysis also provides the basis for further research on the usability in the Netherlands of four U.S. concepts for interagency coordination: (1) the NSC as the interagency process "watchdog," (2) the need to identify one strategic goal, (3) the political-military planning process, and (4) the management tools related to the political-military planning process. The outcome is that the Dutch government could apply these concepts.

However, in the U.S. experience, interagency coordination has not always been conducted successfully. Therefore, the U.S. lessons learned have to be taken into account in case the Dutch government considers implementation of these concepts.



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In 1993, after having returning from a demining mission in Cambodia, I proposed an interagency operation. The idea was to establish a humanitarian demining organization that would consist of army engineers and that would be funded by the Ministry of Development Cooperation. The then Deputy Chief of Defense Staff for Operations, Rear Admiral (retired) Waltmann, stated that this idea was unrealistic. He suggested postponing the advancement of this initiative until I graduated from the Dutch CGSOC. Eight years later I am proud to say that I graduated from both the Dutch and the U.S. CGSOC and that my interagency ideas have not faded. Sir, you see the results in front of you. Thank you for challenging me.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review
AO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CCIA	Coordination Center for International Affairs
CCO	Complex Contingency Operation
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers Course
CHR	Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
COL	Colonel
DART	Disaster Assistance Reconnaissance Team
DC	Deputy Committee
DCBC	Defensie Crisis Beheersings Centrum
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic Instruments of Power
DOD	Department of Defense
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ExComm	Executive Committee
EU	European Union
FAS	Feasible, Acceptable, and Suitable

FASA	Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, and Adequate
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Association
GNA-86	Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
GO	Governmental Organization
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	International Organization
IOC	Interagency Operations Center
IWG	Interagency Working Group
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
Joint Pub	Joint Publication
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ	Major
MITACO	Ministeriele Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCC	National Coordination Center
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NRC	Nieuw-Rotterdamse Courant
NSA-47	National Security Act of 1947
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy

OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PC	Principals Committee
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RNLA	Royal Netherlands Army
RRR	Regeringscommissaris voor de Reorganisatie van de Rijksdienst
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SER	Socio Economic Council
SSI	Strategic Studies Institute
SWNCC	State War Navy Coordinating Committee
UN	United Nations
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.	United States
USACAC	United States Army Combined Arms Center
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College
USAWC	United States Army War College
USG	U.S. Government
USN	United States Navy
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
VROM	Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu
WRR	Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid
WVC	Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur
XO	Executive Officer

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

It isn't about the single means. The combination is the venom!<sup>1</sup>

M. Montignac, *Eat Yourself Slim*

#### The Dutch Government and Interagency Coordination

##### Diplomatic Row Over the Support to Bosnia

In July 2000, a diplomatic row occurred in the Netherlands over the subject of foreign aid to Bosnia. Bosnia is a vulnerable issue for the Netherlands because of the concern over peace and stability in the Balkans and also because of the Srebrenica debacle. In terms of foreign aid, the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation annually spends almost 150 million Dutch guilders (\$70 million) in Bosnia.<sup>2</sup>

Despite this commitment of financial resources, the Ambassador to the United Nations Van Walsum told the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in August 2000 that an American research initiative on fraud determined Bosnia to be a "corrupt country, involved in the smuggling of cigarettes in which many high government officials are involved as well. It is not worth spending that much money, because most of it will go to criminals and frauds anyway, amongst them high government officials."<sup>3</sup> The Minister for Development Cooperation, Mrs. Herfkens, got furious and modified and shaded these statements shortly after this UNSC meeting. According to the *NRC Handelsblad*--an authoritative Dutch newspaper--a diplomatic row within the Netherlands was born, although none of the players had said a wrong word. On one thing everyone agreed--and the Parliament came immediately to the same conclusion--a public disagreement on foreign policy like that could only be harmful for the Netherlands.<sup>4</sup>

This example demonstrates the permanent struggle between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Development Cooperation, the difference between the diplomats and

the foreign aid workers.<sup>5</sup> Even after the foreign policy had been reconsidered in 1995 in order to emphasize unity of effort, both in policy and in operations, there still were two separate entities dealing with foreign affairs.<sup>6</sup> Making matters more difficult, both diplomats and foreign aid workers seem all too ready to express contempt for one another.

### The Dutch Government and the Lack of Interagency Coordination

The example is more or less symptomatic of the public service disunity in the Netherlands. Formally, one *Rijksdienst* (public service) exists, but there is hardly any accord. Each minister has his own responsibility, enjoys considerable independence within the Cabinet of Ministers and the government, and has his own department at his disposal. This has led to considerably fragmented public service positions.

The fact that all administrations are based on political coalitions compounds this fragmentation.<sup>7</sup> Elected officials from two or three political parties will govern the country based on a *Regeerackoord* (coalition agreement). This agreement defines the boundaries of each minister's or secretary of state's (in the U.S. under secretary's) responsibilities. On the other hand this agreement also defines how much latitude each of the officials--and therefore each of the ministries--has. Often, officials do not see the necessity--partially based on the difference of opinion that can be noticed between officials that have a different political background--to cooperate and to coordinate through mechanisms besides this coalition agreement.

Since World War II, at least four working groups and committees have tried to work on solutions for a better connection between the departments. None of them was able to solve the communication and adjustment problems entirely, although some interagency structures and coordination instruments were transitioned and implemented. Chapter four of this thesis will cover extensively and in more detail the backgrounds of the development of these mechanisms



and the reason why there still exists a lack of coordination within the government. The main interagency mechanisms at the moment are the following:

On the political level:<sup>8</sup>

1. The *Prime Minister*, chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, who is responsible for the coherence of governmental policy.

2. The *Cabinet of Ministers* (or Council of Ministers), a cabinet that is responsible for the decision-making and unity of governmental policy. The cabinet can decide to establish under boards in which only the closely related ministers participate.

3. *Under Boards* for the Cabinet of Ministers, boards that are responsible for the preparation of decisions for new policies.

4. The *Coordinating Minister*, who is responsible for the execution of the agreed policy. This minister has to coordinate between the involved ministries.

5. The *Project State Secretary* for specific and time-limited issues. This is a concept that has been introduced in the administrations in recent years.

On the civil service level:<sup>9</sup>

1. *Civil Service Boards*, boards that are to prepare new policy

2. *Interagency Committees*, committee that are responsible for the coordination between two departments (compare: U.S. Interagency Working Groups [IWGs])

3. *Interagency Project Organizations*, project organizations that equal the Interagency Committees but on a temporary basis

4. *Process Organizations*, organizations that deal with subjects that are applicable to the same processes at other ministries. An example is the Finance Inspection (of the Ministry of Finance) that checks and audits financial processes at the other ministries.

## The Lack of Interagency Cooperation in International Affairs

In the field of international affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a primary role, although it increasingly has been recognized that international aspects affect other ministries.<sup>10</sup> Policy making for development coordination by the Minister of Development Cooperation and defense issues by the Minister of Defense is subordinate to the foreign affairs policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs further recognizes the fact that interagency coordination happens, but quite often insufficiently and too late.<sup>11</sup> The result is that the Netherlands often is highly involved in an international relations issue--a large military component, many foreign aid workers, and spending lots of money for nation building--but mostly without a central plan, without unity of effort, and thus without taking Dutch national interests into account. It is therefore logical that the level of influence for the Netherlands is low; a situation that has been aggravated by the Netherlands' comparatively limited sources of power.

The example on the support to Bosnia is not the only one that supports this conclusion. Another example occurred during the mid and late nineties. For several years the Netherlands sent numerous troops to former Yugoslavia. Although this military contribution was on an average the fifth largest of the participating countries, this led hardly to any political influence. The other members (the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy) did not allow the Netherlands to enter the Yugoslavia Board, an influential board in which a wide variety of policy issues on the Balkans are discussed and coordinated. According to many critics inside and outside the Netherlands, the Netherlands had itself to blame because of a fragmented and inefficient use of its instruments of power in dealing with the Bosnia crisis. The same critics suggested that the Dutch government should have used these instruments in a combined effort to gain more influence.

Based on the institutional lack of coordinating instruments in the field of foreign affairs policy,<sup>12</sup> and the aforementioned examples, it is not hard to come to the conclusion that the lack

of interagency coordination on the national level inhibits the execution of a consistent foreign affairs policy.

#### Ministry of Defense and Interagency Operations

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the primary role in the foreign affairs policy. Other ministries like Development Coordination, Economic Affairs, and Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fishery, have to ground their policies on the foreign affairs policy, as the Ministry of Defense has to do. The Minister of Defense is one of the actors involved in the preparation and execution of foreign affairs policy. His department is developing ideas regarding interagency coordination and interagency operations. Since this is subordinate to the Foreign Affairs policy, it will give a bottom-up point of view of the same issue: interagency coordination concerning international relations issues.

The most recent source of information to reveal this point of view is the *Defense White Paper 2000*.

#### The Defense White Paper 2000

Before elaborating on the new policy, framed in the *Defense White Paper 2000*, another document is worth mentioning as well as the process that led to the draft of this white paper. This document is the *Framework Memorandum* of January 1999, which was the starting point and guideline for the defense white paper, based on the coalition agreement. The memorandum was also the starting point for the *Strategic Discussion on the Future of Defense*. In this discussion every citizen and every organization that would like to contribute to the new policy on the future of the armed forces, could participate in forums, meetings, et cetera to express their opinions. The outcome of this discussion led eventually to the *Defense White Paper 2000*.

At the end of 1999 the Netherlands Ministry of Defense issued the *Defense White Paper 2000*, which provides for the Armed Forces the goals to aim at in the coming decade. During the

nineties the Netherlands Armed Forces had to face a tremendous transformation. A major part of it was the transition into an all-volunteer force as it restructured and downsized. Another part had to do with the transformation from a relatively static, general defense army, bound to the Northern German Plains, to a much more agile expeditionary force. Logical, therefore, was a more active participation in several peace support operations (PSO). This transformation was described in three former white papers (*Defensienota 1991*, *Prioriteitennota 1993*, and *Herijkingsnota 1994*).

The fourth white paper, however, was still necessary, because final steps towards completion of the transformation process were needed, as well as the inclusion of recent international developments and experiences gained during recent operations (for example recent or ongoing peace operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Cyprus).<sup>13</sup> The document addressed the needs for further development of the Netherlands Armed Forces. It also stated that the Armed Forces "have to be prepared for the missions that would come up in the 21st century." This meant, more specifically, a broad range of tasks in various scenarios and alliances. Flexibility and multifunctional deployability were keywords in this document.<sup>14</sup> In 2000, after being discussed in Parliament, the white paper became law. It had to provide--and still provides--the leading thought for the further development of the armed forces.

#### The Defense White Paper 2000 and Interagency Coordination

Several times both the white paper and the framework memorandum mentioned examples of already existing interagency operations and interagency coordination. For example, civil police tasks conducted by the military police, civil air traffic control conducted by the Air Force, coast guard missions conducted by the Navy, and general military support conducted by the Army. Another example of an existing task that was used in the white paper is the support of the Dutch Navy for the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) in their counterdrug operations on the Netherlands Antilles.

Besides the existing tasks, both documents identified many more new tasks, because several domestic social challenges have arisen or evolved. These tasks include border control and the fight against drug trade and drug trafficking, especially related to the open borders in Europe. Other examples are or might be the deployment of counterterrorism units, to execute explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks, the support of the emergency measures for large groups of people, and the support in tracking of environmental offences.

Because of the "new tasks and missions", both the *Framework Memorandum* and the *Defense White Paper 2000* recognized the need for:<sup>15</sup>

closer cooperation between the armed forces and other agencies. The new international security situation needs a broad and active security policy after all, in which political, economical, financial instruments of power and if necessary, also military means in close cooperation would have to be used.<sup>16</sup>

According to the white paper, a working group, consisting of representatives from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, and Defense has to shape this 'closer' cooperation.

#### Interagency Coordination for International Issues

Traditionally, the domestic operations on issues with a national impact, like flooding in more than one province, and security of important foreign officials, are led by the National Coordination Center (NCC), an executive branch of the Ministry of the Interior.<sup>17</sup> The coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Development Cooperation, and Ministry of Defense, however, for operations outside the Netherlands territory is a more recent development. Particularly from the standpoint of the Ministry of Defense an increasing number of interagency operations and cooperation could be identified, especially since the armed forces are much more involved in PSO. Examples are small-scale development projects managed by the military and financed by the Ministry of Development Cooperation, like the restoration of an elementary school in the area of operation (AO) of a Security Force (SFOR) battalion in Bosnia, or the establishment of a military Disaster Assistance Reconnaissance Team (DART) to

prepare and survey the deployment of units for disaster relief operations, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Besides that, in PSO the operational and tactical units have to cooperate with a wide variety of local governmental organizations (GOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and international organizations (IOs). The commander of a military unit will often meet representatives from the civilian organizations in his area of responsibility. Cooperation can range between exchange of information and fully integrated operations. This kind of interagency coordination is often crucial for the success of an operation. The establishment of a permanent civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) unit, operational as of 2002, is a logical result from this development. This CIMIC unit will work on the tactical level. It is not hard to conclude that on the tactical level the cooperation between agencies in several interagency operations is quite good and further development is to be expected.

Although the above-mentioned examples all are very good initiatives for a closer interagency relation, the *Framework Memorandum* calls up for further development of the cooperation between other (governmental) agencies and the armed forces. Instead of several loose initiatives, there is a need for a broad and integrated approach on interagency cooperation and operations, especially on the national level and in particular for the preparation phase of an operation. On the national level, however, interagency cooperation exists primarily on an ad hoc basis in the earlier mentioned interagency committees or interagency project organizations. There is no formal institution on the governmental level that focuses specifically on the process of interagency cooperation for international issues. In short, a lack of interagency coordination on the national level in the Netherlands is apparent.

#### The United States' Approach: A Benchmark

Since interagency cooperation and interagency operations are a fairly new area for the Netherlands government and more in particular for the Netherlands armed forces, there is a need

to explore the possibilities, the challenges, and the restrictions in this field. The foremost way to find out is to learn from countries that are more experienced in these kinds of operations. One of those countries is the United States.

America made the first formal steps towards interagency coordination in 1947 by implementing the National Security Act. The first real interagency operation, however, did not occur before the end of the eighties though (the war on drugs).<sup>18</sup> The interagency policy is still evolving. The main difference between the U.S. approach and the Dutch approach is that the U.S. government (USG) conducts interagency operations based on formal regulations or policies and the Dutch government acts in a more informal way; a lack of effective policy can be recognized. Besides these differences--and there are more differences to be taken into account (for instance, the U.S. is a global player, the Netherlands is much more a regional player)--this research focuses mainly on the similarities and the lessons learned in the USG experience. This is interesting, because the challenges of today's security environment require more and better cooperating agencies to have a more effectively operating government for bigger and smaller nations alike.

The U.S. formal interagency coordination system involves a National Security Council (NSC) on the strategic level as well as presidential decision directives (PDDs), which give guidelines for conducting and improving the interagency coordination. On the operational level the U.S. has created joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) for counterdrug operations and homeland defense. On the tactical level the U.S. designed and executed interagency plans for PSO (for instance for Kosovo, Bosnia, and East Timor). The U.S. has learned also some lessons from several interagency operations, and the conclusion is that, despite progress, there are still many processes and regulations to be improved. For instance, to some critics PDD-56, which addresses interagency cooperation, is not effective enough.<sup>19</sup> This all suggests that a U.S. case study on interagency coordination--including the lessons learned in the U.S.--might be relevant in

order to provide suggestions to improve the interagency coordination on a national level within the Netherlands government.

### The Research Question

#### Primary Question

Can Dutch interagency coordination in international affairs be conducted more effectively?

#### Secondary Questions

The secondary questions can be divided in one why question and four how questions:

1. Why: Why were mechanisms created for interagency coordination? Are there differences or similarities between the U.S. situation then and the Dutch situation at present?
2. How: How does the U.S. organize for interagency coordination? Could the Dutch government design a similar organization?
3. How: What are the U.S. policy and the U.S. regulations for interagency coordination? What elements are applicable to the Dutch governmental system?
4. How: What institutional-cultural problems had the U.S. to face by introducing and later on, executing interagency coordination? What might be the problems that the Dutch government has to overcome if it decides to introduce a system or institution for interagency coordination?

#### Tertiary Question

What are currently the shortfalls regarding interagency coordination within the Dutch government?

### Effects--Significance of the Study

The improvement of interagency coordination on the national level could lead to some remarkable effects. First, to involve all actors that will be deployed in a certain area of



responsibility would improve the outcome of an operation or policy and more in particular, the output of the preparation phase of an operation or policy. Secondly, the outcome for each of the agencies (and their individual operations or policies) involved in a multi-interagency issue could increase reasonably. This should prompt a more effective and more efficient overall operation or policy. This would cause more cost-effective agencies, which equals a higher stockholders value for the taxpayers. This is especially important for the Ministry of Defense, since there is an ongoing debate on the *raison d'être* of armed forces, especially after the inner German Wall fell.

Moreover, for the Dutch government a more effective approach to the problem could lead to more influence in foreign affairs and to a better use of its instruments of power. The Netherlands sees themselves as the biggest of the smaller countries or the smallest of the bigger countries. From an economic point of view this may be right, but from the international relations' point of view this statement is doubtful. The aforementioned example of the lack of political influence in the Bosnian peace process, being the fifth largest troop contributor, speaks for itself. A small country should bundle the limited power it has available or as S. K. Hamilton concludes in his report *Postconflict Operations: Evolution of an Interagency Doctrine*, "in virtually every case, all forms of national power must be integrated to create the desired conditions."<sup>20</sup>

There could be some more benefits for the Netherlands. A more integrated approach to PSO, for instance, could result in a situation that the money the Netherlands Department of Development Cooperation spends in an AO for nation building, could be controlled by the Dutch government (the armed forces) and could be applied by a Dutch contractor. Some other countries already opted for an approach like this.<sup>21</sup> In the long term the Netherlands and its industries and enterprises might benefit from a very early economical involvement.

#### Assumptions

In this research a comparison between the U.S. and the Dutch interagency cooperation will be made, based on the assumption that both mechanisms are reasonably comparable. This

assumption acknowledges though that the U.S. approach is more formal and the Dutch approach more informal.

Parts of the research consist of a chronological overview of the way Dutch interagency coordination developed between 1977 and 1993. Because after 1993 no other committees have been working in this field or no relevant reports have been issued, the assumption is that the current situation is nearly the same as it was in 1993. Although not directly dealing with the same subject, another investigation--conducted in 1999 and 2000 on the fall of the Srebrenica enclave (a parliamentary committee, Committee Bakker)--showed some conclusions that indirectly refer to the issue of interagency coordination. These conclusions will be included in this research.

The research is based on the assumption that interagency cooperation and interagency coordination will facilitate the achievement of objectives and aims more effectively and more efficiently.<sup>22</sup> Interagency cooperation as such is therefore a desirable outcome of this research.

#### Definition of terms

In an alphabetical order:

Agencies: The separate agencies are distinguished between Governmental Organizations (GOs) and a collection of three main groups of other agencies. According to the U.S. doctrine, these main groups of other agencies are NGOs, PVOs and IOs:<sup>23</sup>

1. NGOs are transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. NGOs may be professional organizations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). NGOs is a term normally used for non-U.S. organizations.

2. PVOs are private, nonprofit, humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. PVOs are normally United States- based. PVOs is often used synonymously with the term NGO.

3. IOs are organizations with global influence, such as Red Cross and the United Nations.

The agencies in this thesis will mainly concern GOs.

Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operations: A group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.<sup>24</sup>

FASA Test: A general but comprehensive test to assess the applicability of a concept, strategy, or idea by reviewing the feasibility, the acceptability, the suitability, and the adequacy of that a specific concept, strategy, or idea.<sup>25</sup>

Definitions concerning the governmental systems in the U.S. and the Netherlands:

1. Administration: Team of (political appointed) top administrators composed of the Chief Executive, his department heads and principals advisors.<sup>26</sup>

2. Government: The direction of national or regional public affairs. It is the representative of the public will and it is technically divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches.<sup>27</sup>

3. Cabinet Government: Type of government not known in the U.S. The positions of Chief of State and Prime Minister are separated. The Prime Minister and the heads of the ministries share executive power. The government is responsible to the legislature, which may oust any member, or the entire cabinet, by vote of no confidence. The Chief of State or the Prime Minister in turn may dissolve the legislature.<sup>28</sup> Further explanation will follow in Appendix A (Government in the Netherlands).

4. The Public Service (or in the Netherlands: *Rijksdienst*): Organization that administers the country, conducted for the benefit of the community as a whole.<sup>29</sup>

The term government will be used for both the American and the Dutch situation. Administration will primarily refer to the USG; cabinet government and public service mainly to the Netherlands.

Interagency Coordination or Interagency Cooperation: Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination or cooperation that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged USG agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.<sup>30</sup> Interagency coordination on the national level is restricted to national (in the Netherlands: Dutch governmental) agencies.

#### Levels of Military Operation versus Coordination on the National Level:

1. The execution of military operations is categorized into five levels, namely the *political-strategic*, the *military-strategic*, the *operational*, the *tactical* and the *technical* level. There is no clearly defined boundary between these levels. Very often successive levels overlap.<sup>31</sup>

2. The national level may include one or more parts of the five levels of military operations. In the Netherlands most likely the national level include (parts of) the upper three levels and will not be restricted to strictly the military instrument of power.

National Security: A collective term, used in the U.S., encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: (a) a military or defense advantage over a foreign nation or group of nations, or (b) a favorable foreign relations position, or (c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile, or destructive action form within or without, overt or covert.<sup>32</sup>

Unity of Effort: The synchronization of all means and all efforts that are applied for one objective.<sup>33</sup>

#### Limitations

Only unclassified literature and documents can be used, due to the international officer status of the writer. If classified sources would lead to another outcome, according to the research committee, a note will be added to that particular part of the research.

This research will be carried out from a military standpoint and from a military view of the problem, because the military background provides the terms of reference for the author. Every terms of reference entails its own bias.

The outcome of the research will be applied first and for all to the military instrument of power. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the outcome is strictly valuable only for the armed forces.

### Delimitations

The interagency coordination discussed in this thesis is limited to international affairs. For domestic operations the Ministry of the Interior is responsible and it consists of a National Coordination Center (NCC) for the command and control of those multi-agency (crisis) operations. Although domestic operations are excluded in this research, the structure and mechanism of the NCC might be subject of further survey.

The research includes GOs on the national level only. In terms of the levels of war, focus is the political strategic and military strategic level, but because of the size of the Netherlands a research on the operational level of interagency coordination in the U.S. might be interesting for the national level in the Netherlands.

This research concentrates on mostly the U.S. approach on interagency coordination. Other nations' policies, regulations, and experiences are excluded because of the possible extent of this research and the availability of literature and documents. This has direct consequences for the scope of this research.

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<sup>1</sup> Michel Montignac, *Eat Yourself Slim (Adapted for North America)* (New York: Michel-Ange Publishing, 1999), 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Dutch* is "of the Netherlands, its people, language, or culture," according to *Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary*. The words *Dutch* and *Netherlands* will both be used, dependable on what is preferable in a specific situation.

<sup>3</sup> "Diplomatieke rel," *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam, The Netherlands), 17 August 2000.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs is comparable to the U.S. Department of State.

<sup>6</sup> The Directorate General International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a supporting role for the Minister of Development Cooperation, a minister without ministry. In the field of Development Cooperation is the Minister of Development Cooperation responsible for the issuing of policy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (through the Directorate General International Cooperation) for the execution of this policy. G. H. J. M. Neelen, M. R. Rutgers, and M. E. Tuurenhout, *De bestuurlijke kaart van Nederland: Het openbaar bestuur en zijn omgeving in nationaal en internationaal perspectief*, (Bussum: Coutinho, 1999), 70-71.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 79-80.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 80-81.

<sup>10</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Review of Foreign Policy*, Chapter 2, "The review of foreign policy," February 2000 [policy on-line]; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?key=306693&pad=257571,305653,257839>; Internet; accessed 13 September 2000.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, in the same chapter the section about "Effective Policy" describes that "several ministries would have to cooperate closely together."

<sup>12</sup> G. H. J. M. Neelen, M. R. Rutgers, and M. E. Tuurenhout, *De bestuurlijke kaart van Nederland: Het openbaar bestuur en zijn omgeving in nationaal en internationaal perspectief* (Bussum: Coutinho, 1999), 79-81

<sup>13</sup> Ministry of Defense, *Defence White Paper 2000: Summary* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1999), 6.

<sup>14</sup> Ministry of Defense, *The Framework Memorandum* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1999), Introduction.

<sup>15</sup> The urge for interagency cooperation was stated more clearly in the Framework Memorandum, than it was ultimately in the Defense White Paper. An example is the security policy. In the Framework Memorandum it is stated that "*the new international security situation*

needed a broad and active security policy after all, in which political, economical, financial instruments of power and if necessary also military means in close cooperation would have to be used." The 2000 Defense White Paper states the same item slightly nuanced: "an active security policy needs efforts in the field of politics, economics, the military and humanitarian affairs." The need for interagency cooperation, however, is underlined in both documents.

<sup>16</sup> Ministry of Defense, *The Framework Memorandum* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1999), Chapter 1.1.

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of the Interior, *Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum: Uitgebreide inleiding*, [policy on-line]; available from <http://www.minbiza.nl>; Internet; accessed 9 September 2000.

<sup>18</sup> William W. Mendel (Senior Military Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, USACAC), interview by author, 12 October 2000, Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>19</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "Study hits White House on peacekeeping missions," *Washington Times*, 6 December 1999.

<sup>20</sup> S. K. Hamilton, *Postconflict Operations: Evolution of an Interagency Doctrine* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995).

<sup>21</sup> In Bosnia the Italian government adopted the railway system. Initially, the Italian railway troops took over the railway system, but ultimately the Italian Railway Industries benefited highly from the money the Italian Ministry of Development Cooperation spend on a new railway system for this Balkan country.

<sup>22</sup> According to some critics, interagency cooperation is not the way to go. An example is the unwillingness and obstruction of some U.S. Departments in the interagency operation against drugs (War on Drugs). Another example within the military is the opinion of some airmen that airpower alone (without land or naval forces) is enough to achieve operational military objectives and goals.

<sup>23</sup> Gary R. Council, *Chaplains Roles in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations* (monograph, U.S. Army War College, 1994), 23.

<sup>24</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Baltimore: GPO, 1994), 78.

<sup>25</sup> For further explanation see chapter 3 in which both the FAS-test and the criterion "adequacy" are outlined into detail.

<sup>26</sup> Rudolph Heimanson, *Dictionary of Political Science and Law* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967), 6.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>29</sup> P. H. Collin ed., *Dictionary of Government and Politics* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998), 47.

<sup>30</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Baltimore: GPO, 1996), GL-8. At the time, this term and its definition were modified and were improved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. An additional modification was applied during this research, by adding 'cooperation' to the original definition of coordination.

<sup>31</sup> Royal Netherlands Army, Doctrine Committee, *Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication, part I: Military Doctrine* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1996), 12-14.

<sup>32</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms* (Baltimore: GPO, 1994), 305.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.



## CHAPTER TWO

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

#### Introduction

Adequate interagency cooperation is a critical prerequisite for successful operations that involve several agencies. Therefore, the issue of interagency cooperation has been the subject of study in many research documents, reports, and articles. Numerous publications have been written and are available to conduct this study. Some theses dealt with interagency coordination; remarkably, hardly any of them have been written on interagency coordination on the national level.

Since this research consists of a comparative analysis between the Dutch and the U.S. system for interagency coordination at the national level, the search for literature concentrated mainly on information about these nations. The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth provided most of the written publications dealing with the American system. For the Dutch situation, the library at the *Instituut Defensie Leergangen* (IDL) or the Netherlands Defense College constituted the access to relevant Dutch publications in general and to the Library of the Parliament for the official government publications more in particular. Additional information could be found in other sources. These sources were mainly accessible through the World Wide Web.

The acquired information can be grouped in three categories. The first category consists of (governmental) information about U.S. interagency cooperation. The second category is comprised of information about Dutch interagency cooperation. Both categories include the U.S. and Dutch Armed Forces doctrinal perspective on interagency cooperation. This information provides a bottom-up view and an expectation of the interagency efforts on the national level (at which the military is one of the main players). Basically, these two categories provide the necessary data for the comparative analysis. A third category has to do with information on the

Dutch governmental system. This information is necessary to provide insight and the background of this system, primarily for the American readers.

Subsequently upon the before-mentioned categorization, this chapter is divided in three main sections: (1) publications on U.S. interagency coordination, (2) publications on Dutch interagency coordination, and (3) publications on the Dutch governmental system. Both sections will address the availability--if any--of information through (1) government publications, (2) books, (3) studies and papers, (4) articles and periodicals, and (5) other sources (for example the Internet, interviews, lectures, etc).

#### Information Category One: Publications on U.S. Interagency Coordination

##### Government Publications

The foremost policy document that shaped interagency coordination in the U.S. is the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA-47). The most important and powerful institution in this field that derived from NSA-47 is the National Security Council (NSC). Many publications describe the role of the NSC regarding interagency coordination. A relevant and comprehensive Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) report is the recent *Organizing for National Security* that delineates the history and roots of the NSC as well as the reasons for the establishment of this institution.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, it provides an update on the current interagency process and gives a general outline for a future development of the NSC.

A second SSI-document is *Structure, Function and the NSC-staff: An Officer's Guide to the National Security Council*.<sup>2</sup> This study provides background on the establishment of the NSC, but deals much more with the structure and the organizational aspects of the NSC. It also contains a prescription for the future, which is less relevant because this document is quite old (1989).

A third valuable source of information is, of course, the NSC itself. Through its web site the NSC gives the reader all the information about the how the NSC came into being in the late

1940s and how the NSC has evolved into its structure and organization at the moment. The website also addresses the issue of interagency coordination.<sup>3</sup>

After NSA-47, the next policy document to considerably shape U.S. interagency efforts is the *Clinton Administration Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56* (PDD-56) of 1997.<sup>4</sup> This PDD is also known as the "mother of all modern PDDs." The PDD-56 is established through an interagency process and shapes that same interagency process. There are some more interesting (governmental) publications on this PDD available. The first document is the *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations*.<sup>5</sup> This NSC handbook explains and articulates the intents and mechanisms of the policy as stated in the PDD. This handbook provides enough tools for the governmental official, who has to deal with interagency issues, to make this process work. Compared to other governmental documents this is the most comprehensive and detailed manual.

Other governmental documents can be found on the Internet through, for example, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) web site.<sup>6</sup> The War College is a relevant institution because it is one of the few institutions that have been tasked by the NSC to conduct the interagency training as mentioned in PDD-56 and an institution that publishes more about PDD-56 than any other organization. Other relevant documents on PDD-56 are mainly nongovernmental and are reactions to the implementation of PDD-56. These publications will be discussed in the section on articles and periodicals.

A third important governmental document is the Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-08 *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.<sup>7</sup> The comprehensive reference establishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman's guidelines for the conduct of interagency coordination by the U.S. Armed Forces. Primarily a document for the military-strategic and operational level, Joint Pub 3-08 is also relevant to answer the question of what the reasons are for the USG to conduct interagency coordination. Joint Pub 3-08 describes the role of the military in the

overarching, national interagency effort, elaborating on the mechanisms that play a role at that level, including the functions of the National Security Council system. It therefore provides relevant insight into the interagency processes that take place at the National Command Authorities' (NCA) level. Secondly, it delineates the coordination between the Armed Forces and other agencies in the political-strategic or national context, including the (desired) effects on that level. Thirdly, Joint-Pub 3-08 outlines in detail fundamental principles, characteristics and features of the nature of interagency coordination at all levels of operation. Next, the document describes what difficulties might have to be overcome and it states the important prerequisites for the successful conduct of an interagency operation on the national level. Finally, this document outlines what the operational level might expect from the NCA in terms of interagency guidelines and prerequisites to be made in order to facilitate the interagency coordination at the operational level.

### Books

Many books describe the phenomenon of interagency coordination. Only a few provide a conceptual framework to understand the processes and interrelationships in an interagency environment. Eugene Bardach's *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship* is one of those books.<sup>8</sup> This book elaborates on theories as well as case studies and methods. It goes into organizational and cultural aspects of interagency collaboration (as the book names it). Interesting also is its approach towards an interagency element as an operating system and how to manage such a system. The book concentrates on interagency coordination in GOs, NGOs, and organizations in the private sector. It therefore provides a broader and more scientific view on this matter, which may lead to a better understanding in the narrow field of governmental interagency efforts in international affairs.

Another book that provides insight in the USG in terms of international affairs is *American National Security*. This book--in different editions--has been a textbook on U.S.

national security for the last three decades. It serves students at most American colleges and universities in understanding policies and processes involving national security. As Senator Sam Nunn states in the foreword of the book, "this significantly revised fifth edition . . . deserves the close scrutiny of American policymakers and students alike."<sup>9</sup> The relevance for this research is based upon the fact that in the USG national security and interagency coordination are closely related.

### Studies and Papers

Relevant studies include, in the first place, three papers written by William W. Mendel and others in which interagency coordination plays a major role. *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations* is a case study of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).<sup>10</sup> This study provides a regional framework that helps the Commander in Chief (CINC) to integrate interagency resources. That framework includes a set of interrelated plans, processes, training, et cetera. The relation between the CINC and the NCA is also of interest to develop an idea of the problems the CINC has to overcome at the operational level and what he can or cannot expect from the national level to solve these problems.

From another point of view--not regional but thematic: the drug threat--the second paper study is an example of a complex interagency cooperation at the national level.<sup>11</sup> *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat* is not primarily an interagency document, but the many times this aspect is addressed in the paper, gives insight to the difficulties that have to be overcome to make such a large and complex operation work. The bottom line is that a "coordinated sequence of properly supported . . . actions is required to make . . . strategies work."<sup>12</sup> To a lesser extent--because mainly the operational level is addressed instead of the national or political strategic level--the same is applicable for a study in the field that was published years earlier: *Campaign Planning and the Drug War*.<sup>13</sup>

In the second place, a significant study in this field is the extended report on *Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian and Transition Programs*.<sup>14</sup> This document contains a critical review on mainly the State Department and USAID involvement in international operations. It gives a detailed view on the real world of interagency coordination. Case studies include U.S. involvement in Kosovo, Sudan, and Afghanistan. The report also points out improvements in this field. It is one of the key documents to read to get an idea of the complexities of interagency coordination and the many difficulties to overcome.

A third study that is relevant for this research was conducted by RAND Corporation's Arroyo Center. In this report, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army*, the researchers examined how the U.S. interagency process can either complicate or enhance U.S. Army Stability and Support Operations (SASO) at three levels: the policy, the operational, and the field level.<sup>15</sup> Particularly the first level, policy, is of interest. The study concludes that there are disconnects between the State Department and the Defense Department on one hand (both focused on crisis response) and USAID on the other hand (long-term providers of aid).<sup>16</sup>

Finally, theses and monographs considering interagency coordination do exist but are hardly useable because they cover mostly the tactical and operational levels. Besides that, no recent report (after the academic year 1996 to 1997) has been written on this subject.

#### Articles and Periodicals

Most of the recent publications on interagency coordination are related to PDD-56 and provide several opinions on this policy from different standpoints. One article, "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," describes what CINCs can do with this policy in order to improve civil-military responses to contingencies.<sup>17</sup> The authors urge the CINCs to establish a full-time interagency operations center (IOC) in order to optimize the interagency process and therefore the effectiveness and efficiency of an operation. From the same

institution--the United States Army War College (USAWC)--another relevant article emerged.

"Complex Emergencies: Under New Management" focuses specifically on the training aspect that is included in the PDD and that is a critical factor to make this policy work.<sup>18</sup>

More recently, "Interagency Cooperation: PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations," reviews PDD-56 and explains the political-military planning process, which is one of the key elements of the PDD.<sup>19</sup> Although the authors admit that it is too early to evaluate the impact of PDD-56, they argue that the elements of PDD-56 have proven to be successful in earlier operations. They also identify some shortfalls in the policy and propose ideas and concepts to neutralize those deficiencies. Another article that merely covers the same topics and the same point of view--the armed forces--is "Today It's Gold, Not Purple."<sup>20</sup>

Numerous other articles on interagency coordination are older (before 1996). Articles like "Interagency Command and Control: Planning for Counter Drug Support" are interesting but less relevant.<sup>21</sup> The changes the authors urge can be regarded as obsolete: most of them have been implemented through PDD-56 or the afore mentioned Joint Pub 3-08. One article that is even older is interesting: "Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations: A Conference Report" articulates the premature military struggle with interagency coordination after the many peace operations in the early 1990s.<sup>22</sup> Many ideas and conclusions on tactical, operational, and strategic level, led to the development of PDD-56 and Joint Pub 3-08 and are still relevant.

#### Other Sources

In addition, the lectures and reading material in the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), Course C-500, provide a lot of information on this topic. Even more valuable and part of the CGSOC's Strategy Program are Course A-512, National Security Policy Formulation, and Course A-514, Current Strategic Concepts. The course material is not only valuable in terms of literature on the thesis topic, but also to provide the background and context in which the U.S. interagency process takes place.

The Internet has been useful, too, in finding information. Frequently used web sites are the ones from the White House under which the NSC web page comes, as well as the Strategic Studies Institute and the National Defense University.<sup>23</sup>

Information Category Two: Publications  
on Dutch Interagency Coordination

Government Publications

As mentioned in chapter one, since World War II several working groups and committees have tried to recommend solution in order to improve the outcome and performance of the government. Throughout this period, interagency coordination has been recognized as a key function, although not every committee considered this as the subject of their research. However, the reports of these committees and the discussion on these reports in Parliament give relevant insight and background to what has and what has not been achieved in the field of interagency coordination. The older the report the less relevant it is; therefore the period of time has been narrowed to the last three decades (1972 to 2001). The documents will be discussed chronologically:

1. In the period 1972 to 1977 three subsequent committees aimed at refining policy between the departments. In their research they concentrated on a better allocation of the duties and responsibilities between the departments as well as the coordination between the departments. The three reports *Bestuursorganisatie bij de Kabinetsformatie 1971*,<sup>24</sup> *De Organisatie van het Openbaar Bestuur: Enkele Aspecten, Knelpunten en Voorstellen*,<sup>25</sup> and *Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie*<sup>26</sup> include many new ideas and solutions that were implemented in the governmental organization. Subsequent committees reviewed the effectiveness of these ideas.

2. Between 1979 and 1981 the Committee Vonhoff issued three reports: *Zou Thorbecke Nu Tevreden Zijn? Rapport nr. 1* in 1979, *Weinigen Denken dat het Goed Gaat. Rapport nr. 2* in



May 1980, and *Elk Kent de Laan die Derwaarts Gaat. Rapport nr. 3* in October 1980. In 1981 this committee was dissolved and its final thoughts and summaries of previous work were included in a final report *Eindadvies* of 1981.<sup>27</sup> The subject of research in that period had been the main structure of the government and public service. Although the ideas were supported by most of the governmental officials and politicians, and despite all the money, time, and effort that was put into this research, remarkably, almost nothing has been done with the recommendations.

3. From 1982 to 1986 was a time of the financial-economic crisis that determined the spirit. No-nonsense was the approach towards problems and after the deception of the effects of the reports in the previous period, this time the pragmatism dominated. The main aim of the Committee Tjeenk Willink was to improve the flexibility of the government. Interagency coordination was not the focus of the committee, but several conclusions and recommendations in subsequent annual reports, *Jaarbericht 1982* (and further),<sup>28</sup> that were issued, were closely related to this subject.

4. It was not until the period 1991 to 1993 that another committee worked on interagency issues again. In the years in between, the focus was completely on cost control and efficiency. The Committee Wiegel, however, aimed at an improved quality of governmental performance. This committee recommended the government to concentrate on the core of the business--policymaking--and to privatize executive elements if possible. This committee emphasized in their report *Naar Kerndepartementen--Kiezen voor een Hoogwaardige en Flexibele Rijksdienst* the need for interagency coordination although hardly any new proposals in this field have been implemented.<sup>29</sup>

5. Since 1993, no overall research on interagency coordination has been conducted. There is another governmental report, though, that deals with interagency coordination. In 2000 the Committee Bakker issued their *Rapport van de Tijdelijke Commissie Buitenlandse Uitzendingen*.<sup>30</sup> This report includes the analysis of the political decision-making process prior to

the participation of Dutch Armed Forces in PSO. The trigger for this parliamentary investigation was the aftermath of the Srebrenica-debacle. For a couple of reasons this report is relevant. First of all, it discusses international affairs and secondly, it provides a snapshot of what has been achieved after so many previous committees have recommended--implemented or not implemented--ideas regarding interagency coordination.

Besides the aforementioned reports by the working groups there are other relevant governmental publications. In November 1999 the Ministry of Defense issued a new white paper.<sup>31</sup> The emphasis on interagency cooperation in the white paper has already been articulated in chapter one. This document therefore provides valuable information on the current policy towards interagency cooperation within the ministry. This policy guides the Armed Forces in their doctrine.

Also relevant are two policy documents by the Minister of Defense. One document *Militaire Aansturing van de Nederlandse Deelname aan Crisisbeheersings- en Vredesoperaties* deals with management on the military-strategic and political-strategic level, especially in the areas of decision-making and the flow of information between the military commanders in an AOR and the actors on the national political-strategic level that are responsible in these issues.<sup>32</sup> The second document describes the decision-making process regarding Dutch involvement in international affairs and more specifically the application of the military instrument of power therein. This document *Toetsingskader voor Uitzending van Militaire Eenheden* provides also a set of rules for the political level. An active Dutch military involvement in international affairs needs to comply with this set of rules, also known as *Het Toetsingskader* (the evaluation framework).<sup>33</sup> These two documents have shaped the government in its approach towards involvement abroad. The documents also outline the responsibilities by all agencies involved including the required coordination. That is why they are relevant for this research.

On the level of the armed forces, two doctrinal publications describe the context of the interagency operations in which the armed forces have to operate and more importantly, have to cooperate and coordinate with a whole range of other GOs and NGOs. These publications are the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) Doctrine Publication, part I: *Military Doctrine* and RNLA Doctrine Publication, part III: *Peace Operations*.<sup>34</sup> Although it deals with military involvement in interagency, it also covers the decision-making process on the political-strategic or national level. It also gives an overview--organizationally, policy wise and culturally--of all actors, nationally and internationally, involved.

### Books

The most useful of many books are the three lecture books issued by the Leiden University. The Leiden University Faculty for Public and Social Management is in charge of the Army Staff's In-Company Study of Public and Social Management to provide officers that work on the Army Staff more insight in the Dutch governmental system.<sup>35</sup> The lecture books serve as the reference manuals for the Dutch governmental system and provide more details about interagency coordination. In sum, they provide a comprehensive view on the issue of interagency coordination in the Netherlands.

The first book *De Bestuurlijke Kaart van Nederland: Het Openbaar Bestuur en zijn Omgeving in Nationaal en Internationaal Perspectief* provides an introduction of the Dutch interagency system and interagency coordination.<sup>36</sup> The second book *Openbaar Bestuur: Beleid, Organisatie en Politiek* gives some more in-depth information on--along with other subjects--interagency coordination, centered around three key-themes: policy and governing, organization and management, and politics and the government.<sup>37</sup> The final book *Politiek-Bestuurlijk Management: Een Blik achter de Gouden Muur* deals with the same topic, but concentrates more on the role of the political level, such as the dynamics of political processes and issues of accountability in an environment that is increasingly viewed as running a business (public

management) rather than running a governmental system with its complexity, inherent chaos, multi-actor interests and sometimes illogical solutions to problems.<sup>38</sup>

### Studies and Papers

Several scientific studies and reports have been written on the subject of interagency coordination (or related to this subject). As a reaction on the aforementioned reports, the background study *Interdepartementale Coördinatie: Rapport over een Onderzoek naar Structuur en Functioneren van de Interdepartementale Coördinatie* is a valuable publication that provides a comprehensive overview of the need for interagency coordination.<sup>39</sup> This study is useful for additional arguments and evidence, but the main source remains the earlier mentioned set of reports.

Two papers provide insight on the position of the Netherlands and the Dutch government on international affairs and both papers address the issue of interagency coordination in this field. The first paper "De Positie van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden: Hoe Nu Verder" is a strategic review of the position and the identity of the Netherlands in the world in terms of social, political, economical, military, and ecological security.<sup>40</sup> This report, written by fifteen students at the Navy Command and General Staff Course, also recommends what the government should or could do to further Dutch interests. These recommendations form an interesting link with interagency coordination.

The second paper is a dissertation on the management of PSO on the military-strategic and operational level in the Netherlands. This document "Vredeoperaties: Een Model voor de Militaire Sturing" also gives a perspective on the political-strategic level and the relationship between the actors on that level.<sup>41</sup> Because of its completeness and accuracy and because it is very detailed and recent (March 1999), this document is very valuable to form an opinion on how interagency coordination in the Netherlands has been conducted in the last decade.

### Articles and Periodicals

A similar view on the matter of interagency coordination as referred to by the last study is the article "Het Defensie Crisis Beheersings Centrum (DCBC): Een Kennismaking," in which the author introduces the reader to how peace operations are managed on the (military-strategic and political-strategic) level of the Chief of Defense Staff. The article was written just after the establishment of the Ministry of Defense Crisis Operations Center (DCBC). The DCBC consists of a staff to support the Chief of Defense Staff in his decision-making process for military operations. The DCBC also manages the flow of information for the Minister of Defense. This article also gives an overview of many of the mechanisms that play a role on the national political-strategic level regarding Dutch participation in international affairs. Interagency coordination is an integral part of those mechanisms.

### Other Sources

The Internet has been useful in finding information about the Dutch government, especially for organizational information and for current policy documents. Organizational information provides the background on the Dutch governmental system and more specifically, the relationship between several departments. Also, documents on current policy regarding international affairs could be downloaded in order to identify the key-players and their responsibilities, duties, and interaction. Frequently used web-sides are those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.<sup>42</sup> Via the Internet, it is possible to view the Dutch television news text-pages and major Dutch news magazines (mostly the *NRC Handelsblad*), which provided interesting political background after the Committee Bakker issued its report in September 2000.<sup>43</sup>

### Information Category Three: Publications on the Dutch Governmental System

The governmental system in the Netherlands needs to be explained to make this thesis readable for the American reader. Publications that provide the information to give a quick introduction to the Dutch are the aforementioned books, used by the Leiden University Faculty for Public and Social Management. In addition to that there are other valuable sources accessible through the Internet. The first one is the *Staats Almanak* (the Federal Almanac) a general guide about what-is-what and who-is-who in the government.<sup>44</sup> Also valuable and from inside the government, the Minister for Major Cities and Integration has developed a website for public servants as well as the civilians on which relevant information about the governmental is published.<sup>45</sup>

### Subconclusion

The review of the available literature clearly shows the continuous struggle for both the U.S. and the Dutch government to make its agencies coordinate and cooperate. The improvement of interagency coordination seems to be a never-ending theme. Numerous researchers have tried to provide both governments with systems, concepts, and models to improve the interagency coordination with varying success. Although many different approaches towards this theme have been utilized, a comparative analysis between two governmental systems could not be found. Such an analysis might give a new perspective on this matter and might therefore add new insights in this struggle to improve interagency coordination.

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<sup>1</sup> Douglas T. Stuart and others, *Organizing for National Security* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC: 2000).

<sup>2</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's Guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute USAWC, 1989).

<sup>3</sup> National Security Council: available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/index.html> Internet; accessed 27 December 2000.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. President, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56: 26 May 1997* (Washington: GPO, 1997).

<sup>5</sup> National Security Council, *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1998).

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Army War College, Peace Keeping Institute: available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pki/pki.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 January 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Baltimore: GPO, 1996).

<sup>8</sup> Eugene Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftmanship* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

<sup>9</sup> Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), ix.

<sup>10</sup> William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995).

<sup>11</sup> William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute USAWC, 1997).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., vii.

<sup>13</sup> William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1997).

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Interagency Review of USG Civilian and Transition Programs* (Washington: GPO, 2000).

<sup>15</sup> Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1997), 7.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," *Parameters, USAWC Quarterly*, winter 98, 99-112.

<sup>18</sup> Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters, USAWC Quarterly*, Winter 1998, 39-50.

<sup>19</sup> William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation – PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 2000, 91-97.

<sup>20</sup> Scott W. Moore, "Today it's Gold not Purple," *Joint Force Quarterly*, autumn 98/winter 99, 100-107.

<sup>21</sup> Christopher M. Schaubelt, "Interagency Command and Control: Planning for Counter Drug Support," *Military Review* (September/October 96): 16-24.

<sup>22</sup> D. M. Last, "Interagency cooperation in Peace Operations – A Conference report," *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, January/February 95, 5-8.

<sup>23</sup> National Security Council: available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/index.html>; The White House: available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov>; National Defense University: available from <http://www.ndu.edu/>; Strategic Studies Institute: available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/stdyprog.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2001.

<sup>24</sup> Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie, *Bestuursorganisatie bij de kabinetsformatie 1971* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1972).

<sup>25</sup> Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur. Enkele aspecten, knelpunten en voorstellen* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1975).

<sup>26</sup> Misteriële Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie (MITACO), *Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie, Tweede Kamer*, zitting 1977, 14649, nrs 1-2.

<sup>27</sup> Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst, *Zou Thorbecke Nu Tevreden Zijn? Rapport nr. 1* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1979); *Weinigen Denken dat het Goed Gaat. Rapport nr. 2* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1980); *Elk Kent de Laan, die Derwaarts Gaat. Rapport nr. 3* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1980); *Eindadvies* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1981).

<sup>28</sup> H.D. Tjeenk Willink, *Jaarbericht 1982* (and further), Regeringscommissie Reorganisatie Rijksdienst (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1982).

<sup>29</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een Hoogwaardige en Flexibele Rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993).

<sup>30</sup> Tijdelijke Commissie Buitenlandse Uitzendingen, *Rapport, Tweede Kamer Vergaderjaar 1999-2000*, 26454, numbers 7 and 8, (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 2000).

<sup>31</sup> Minister of Defense, *The Defense White Paper 2000* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1999).



<sup>32</sup> Minister of Defense, *Militaire Aansturing van de Nederlandse Deelname aan Crisisbeheersings- en Vredesoperaties*, Letter to the Chairman of the Parliament no. 24464 (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1995).

<sup>33</sup> Minister of Defense, *Toetsingskader voor uitzending van militaire eenheden*, Letter to the Chairman of the Parliament no. 23591 (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1994).

<sup>34</sup> Royal Netherlands Army, Doctrine Committee, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication, part I: *Military Doctrine* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1996); and part III: *Peace Operations* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1999).

<sup>35</sup> The author of this thesis attended this course in 1999.

<sup>36</sup> G. H. J. M. Neelen, M.R. Rutgers, and M.E. Tuurenhout, *De bestuurlijke kaart van Nederland: Het Openbaar Bestuur en zijn Omgeving in Nationaal en Internationaal Perspectief* (Bussum: Coutinho, 1999).

<sup>37</sup> U. Rosenthal, *Openbaar Bestuur: Beleid, Organisatie en Politiek* (Alphen aan de Rijn: Samsom H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1996).

<sup>38</sup> J. de Vries and M. van Dam, *Politiek-Bestuurlijk Management: Een Blik achter de Gouden Muur* (Alphen aan de Rijn: Samsom, 1998).

<sup>39</sup> R. H. P. W. Kottman, *Interdepartementale Coördinatie, Rapport over een Onderzoek naar Structuur en Functioneren van de Interdepartementale Coördinatie, Achtergrondstudie nr. 7*, (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1981).

<sup>40</sup> Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Opleidingsrichting Koninklijke Marine, *De Positie van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in een risicovolle wereld: Hoe Nu Verder* (The Hague: IDL, 1995).

<sup>41</sup> P. J. T. M. Hagens, *Vredeoperaties: Een Model voor de Militaire Sturing* (Rotterdam: Erasmus university, 1999).

<sup>42</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs: available from <http://www.minbuza.nl>; Ministry of Defense: available from <http://www.mindef.nl>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2000.

<sup>43</sup> NRC Handelsblad: available from <http://www.nrc.nl>; NOS Teletekst: available from <http://teletekst.nos.nl/cgi-bin/tt/nos/page/t/101>; Internet; accessed 30 November 2000.

<sup>44</sup> De Staatsalmanak: available from <http://staatsalmanak.sdu.nl/cgi/login>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2000.

<sup>45</sup> Minister for Major Cities and Integration: available from <http://www.overheid.nl/organisatie-index.html> and <http://www.overheid.nl/buitenland.html> Internet; accessed 28 November 2000.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH DESIGN

#### Introduction

Chapter one has provided the necessary background to understand the problem. It has described the research question and it has made clear the significance of a solution for the problem. Subsequently, in chapter two the existing literature on the research question was evaluated, looking for patterns and gaps in the current literature and other sources (like web sites on the World Wide Web). These first chapters provide a firm base upon which to build research. This chapter, chapter three, outlines in detail the specific research methods and techniques applied to solve the problem.

The overall research method is a comparative analysis between the interagency coordination conducted in the U.S. and the interagency coordination conducted in the Netherlands. The sources are mainly literature although some interviews will be included in the research, too. The review of literature will be done according to the "rules of evidence." These rules refer--for instance--to relevancy, accuracy, deep enough investigation, representativity, logic, credibility, and objectivity.<sup>1</sup>

The research will be conducted in four major steps. Step 1 of the research will provide the historical context on the attempts of the Dutch government to create more and better coordination between different governmental agencies. This step is also necessary to provide insight into the Dutch governmental system. Besides that, this step aims, in part, to address step 2.

Step 2 seeks to answer the why question: Why is there a need for interagency coordination? To answer this question another historical analysis is required, namely to identify the need for interagency coordination in America. This will lead the research back to the National Security Act of 1947. A comparison between the Dutch struggle in the past decades and reasons behind the American formal mechanisms will lead to some answers.

In step 3 of the research, the goal is to provide tools for the conduct of interagency coordination in the Netherlands. This is based on the U.S. theories and policies on interagency coordination as well as lessons learned after interagency operations were executed and interagency coordination occurred. In short, step 3 of the research answers the how questions. An example is a proposal for an organizational change, like the establishment of an institution similar to the U.S. National Security Council within the Dutch government.

Finally, step 4 of this research is the conclusions and recommendations. In this step the tools to improve interagency coordination will be assessed in order to answer the ultimate question: Can Dutch interagency coordination in international affairs be conducted more effectively? Figure 1, The Research Design, provides a layout of the research.




Figure 1: Research Design

### Step 1--The Historical Context of Dutch Interagency coordination

Chapter four will cover step 1 of the analysis. That chapter will consist of a historical overview on the period 1972 to 1993, acknowledged by a report in 2000, about the Dutch governmental system in general and Dutch interagency coordination in particular. The main sources for this overview are reports, made by several committees that have been working on improving the government. All committees have investigated ways to improve the coordination between governmental agencies as part of the solution to improve the governmental performance. Many shortfalls in interagency coordination have been identified; several proposals have been made to solve problems and only a few were implemented. These reports are a good source for looking for trends in the conclusions of the several committees in terms of the need for interagency coordination.

Besides that, in a recent report from the parliamentary committee on the political decision making for peace operations--the report of the Committee Bakker in August 2000--some conclusions concerning interagency coordination have been drawn.<sup>2</sup> This report is interesting for two reasons: (1) it is new and it therefore provides current information that can support or refute the conclusions drawn from earlier reports, and (2) it deals with international affairs, which is the area of concentration of this research. The historical overview, which covers almost three decades, is a stepping-stone for the comparison between the efforts in the Dutch government to make agencies cooperate and USG systems for interagency coordination. It gives an overview of the Dutch side of the comparison.

A designed side effect of this chapter is a better understanding of the Dutch governmental and political systems, mechanisms, and culture. This gives insight in the way the Dutch government governs the country. Appendix A delineates in more detail the Dutch governmental system. This is required especially for Americans but to some extent for the Dutch, too. After all, not many people know exactly how their government does business, regardless what country they

call home. An understanding of the government is necessary to be able to assess critically the outcome of the research, ultimately leading to conclusions and recommendations.

### Step 2--The Necessity for Interagency Coordination (Why)

Chapter five will cover step 2 of the analysis. The outcome of this chapter will be an answer on the why question. This chapter will start to reflect a historical analysis in order to identify the reasons for the USG to conduct interagency coordination. A key year for America is 1947, the year in which Congress approved the National Security Act. Part of this act aimed at better cooperation between the governmental agencies and described methods, systems, and organizations to realize this intended improvement. Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, are also important, because those documents have shaped the way the Americans think of interagency coordination.

The next step in this chapter is to compare the U.S. situation and reasoning that led to the different policies in the USG to the Dutch government in 2000. If the question as to why mechanisms were created for interagency coordination can be answered, the next question might be answerable, too: Are the same reasons applicable for the Dutch government in 2000? Just two criteria to make a good assessment are required: difference and similarity. In case an argument to make agencies work together is different, that argument does not necessarily have to be applicable to the Dutch situation at present. Differences can occur because of many causes: the size of the Netherlands, the culture, another governmental system, the argument might be outdated, et cetera. The other criterion--similarity--works the other way around. The criterions similarity and difference will be further explained in chapter five.

The comparison will be made based on the historical overview of the U.S. system in this chapter and the Dutch governmental system in chapter four. After this analysis, the question of

whether there are any differences or similarities in the field of interagency coordination between the U.S. situation in the past and the Dutch situation at present can be answered.

Two answers in relation to the similarity can be possible, which are yes or no. In case the answer is no (there are no similar reasons or arguments that would plea for cooperation between governmental agencies in the Netherlands), the research will come to an end. If the answer is yes, the next chapter will try to produce some tools to enable this cooperation.

This part of the analysis will also be used to get a first idea of the tools and concepts that the USG uses and that might be useful in the Netherlands. These tools and concepts will form the basis for the next step of the analysis.

The yes answer is important for another reason, too. If the answer is yes, then there will be arguments to support that answer. Logically, the total of these arguments reflect the shortfall in the current system. These arguments are important for the final step of the analysis (see step 4). One step before that, which is the next step of the research, to determine the concepts and tools to improve interagency coordination, the analysis will conclude with a list of suggestions for the Dutch government to improve interagency coordination. In the final step, an assessment of these suggestions will be made. The criteria for this assessment will be the same as the arguments that led to the yes answer in step 2.

### Step 3--Ways to Conduct Interagency coordination (How)

Chapter six will cover step 3 of the analysis. The aim of chapter six of the research is to determine ways and tools to make agencies work together more efficiently. In this chapter another comparison between the U.S. and the Dutch situation will be made. If the reasons why the Dutch government should conduct interagency coordination more effectively are to be derived from the U.S. approach, the tools to make it happen might be derived from the U.S. system, too.

First, an analysis of the literature will outline the formal U.S. policy on interagency coordination. Three areas of interests will categorize the outcome of this analysis: organization,

policy, and the institutional-cultural aspects of interagency coordination. A synthesis of literature on interagency coordination suggests that these categories either are the areas of interest that cover the most important sources of hindrance or serve as force multipliers to make agencies work together.<sup>3</sup> The secondary questions reflect the importance of these areas. This first part of the analysis is aimed at the conceptual or doctrinal basis of interagency coordination in the U.S.; it will reveal the way the U.S. in theory conducts interagency coordination.

However, there is a significant difference between the way interagency cooperation ought to be conducted and the way it is conducted. Main examples of this tendency can be found in Hamblet and Kline's "Interagency Coordination: PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations" in which they conclude that "the program is in its infancy and in some aspects falls short of the President's intent."<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, the next part of the analysis will research the evaluation and lessons learned from operations and other occasions in which interagency coordination was an important if not a critical element. This part of the analysis will focus on the presence or absence of the conceptual mechanisms that the U.S. policy provides. The importance of this step is firstly that it brings the concepts and ideas back from the ideal world of Avalon to the stubbornness of the real world and secondly that it has to be taken into account if parts of the U.S. policy are recommended to the Dutch situation.<sup>5</sup> It provides the necessary shade of meaning.

The third part of the research on how to conduct interagency coordination involves gathering information on the official U.S. policy on interagency coordination and the way this policy has been executed. This part will be provided by an interview with one or more subject matter experts. Besides new information, an interview can validate the analysis of the literature on U.S. policy, evaluations, and potential lessons learned. Appendix B describes in more detail this interview.

To conclude this 3rd step of the analysis, a comparative analysis between the U.S. and the Dutch situation will be conducted. For the Dutch situation, the analysis will refer to the outcome of chapter four. As mentioned before, the U.S. tools and concepts have been described and divided into three categories: (1) organization, (2) policy, and (3) culture. In order to identify what elements of the U.S. approach towards interagency coordination might be applicable to the Dutch situation, the FASA-test will be used as set of criteria. The FASA-test equals the FAS-test<sup>6</sup>, supplemented with another criterion: adequacy<sup>7</sup>. This test has been taught in CGSOC, course C-500, mainly to analyze strategies and plans. The general FASA-test includes the questions as depicted in the following table.

Table 1: General FASA-test

F	Feasibility	Is the application of means (resources) to ways (COAs) feasible?
A	Acceptability	Is the application of means (resources) to ends (benefits) acceptable?
S	Suitability	Are the ends (objectives) suitable to lead to the desired effects (values/interests)?
A	Adequacy	Are the ways to achieve the ends adequate?

Specified for this research and tailored to the Dutch situation, these questions will be transformed as depicted in the following table.

Table 2: Specified FASA-test

F	Feasibility	Is the application of the tool feasible or need additional measures to be taken?
A	Acceptability	Is the application of the tool acceptable (according to the constitution, governmental regulations, law or common manners in the Dutch governmental system?)
S	Suitability	Will the proposed tools be suitable (will the tool provide a solution for the existing shortfalls?)
A	Adequacy	Will the proposed tools be adequate (will the tool provide an effective and efficient solution.)



#### Step 4--Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter seven will reflect the conclusions that have been drawn throughout the thesis. However, before recommendations will be made, a final assessment is necessary in order to provide an answer to the primary question: Can Dutch interagency coordination in international affairs be conducted more effectively? As mentioned before--in step 2 of the research--the criteria that will be used to make this assessment are based on the arguments that led to a yes as an answer to the following question: Does the Netherlands need interagency coordination? After all, the sum of all these arguments describes the current shortfall in the Dutch system. If so, then they are usable for testing the suggested improvements because, indeed, improvements have to address these shortfalls; otherwise it would not be improvements. Therefore, the list of suggestions as tools to improve the conduct of interagency coordination as an outcome of step 3 of the research, will be subjected to these criteria. Also based on these criteria, for each of the suggested improvements the intended or expected effects will be stated.

Recommendations will conclude this chapter.

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<sup>1</sup> Command and General Staff College, Student Text ST 20-10, *Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 2000), 13.

<sup>2</sup> Tijdelijke Commissie Buitenlandse Uitzendingen, *Rapport*, Tweede Kamer Vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26454, numbers 7 and 8, (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 2000). This report will be further examined in chapter 4.

<sup>3</sup> See chapter 2.

<sup>4</sup> William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation: PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly*, spring 2000, 92.

<sup>5</sup> Avalon is, based on a Celtic legend, an island paradise in the west where King Arthur and other heroes supposedly went after death and commonly referred to as the ideal world.

<sup>6</sup> The FAS-test is a common set of criteria usable for testing a strategic course of action; they are not limited to just a military strategy, according to CGSOC, C-500 lesson 1, Reading D "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy" by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. The FAS-test can be found in Chairman, Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Baltimore: GPO, 1995), Appendix B.

<sup>7</sup> Definition: Adequacy is--according to Chairman, Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Baltimore: GPO, 1994), 5--an operation plan review criterion. Adequacy is the determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DUTCH INTERAGENCY COOPERATION, 1972 TO 1993

#### Introduction

This chapter will provide a historical overview of the period 1972 to 1993 and the attempts of the Dutch government to create more and better cooperation between the several governmental agencies. The historical trend will be acknowledged by a report that was issued in 2000 on the Dutch governmental system in general and Dutch interagency cooperation in particular. The following question, which is the tertiary research question, will be answered, What are currently the shortfalls regarding interagency coordination within in the Dutch government? The answer will be supported by arguments in the areas of the policy, organization, and culture of interagency coordination.

The historical overview, which covers mostly the last quarter of a century, is a stepping stone in the comparison between the efforts in the Dutch government to make agencies cooperate and USG systems for interagency cooperation; it gives an overview of the Dutch side of the comparison. An intended side effect of this chapter is a better understanding of the Dutch governmental and political systems, mechanisms, and culture. In addition, Appendix A, The Government in the Netherlands, will provide some more information on the Dutch way of governing in order to achieve a basic understanding of that governmental system. An understanding of the Dutch government is required to be able to critically assess the outcome of the research, ultimately leading to conclusions and recommendations.

#### Background on Committees

The quality of the government has a great impact on the well being of the society and the population of the nation. Governmental business substantially influences the day-to-day life of

most of the people. Governments are therefore obligated to strive to improve their performance in order to be more effective, efficient, flexible, and transparent. After all, the taxpayers deserve to get as much value for their money as possible.

In the Netherlands the process of improving the quality of the government and the *Rijksdienst* (public service) has been the subject of research nearly continuously for the last decades. Several committees (governmental, external, and scientific) have been studying ways to improve the government's performance.<sup>1</sup> One of the major subjects of research in these studies has been the connection and interrelation between politics, policy, government and public service, in short the interagency coordination.<sup>2</sup>

Despite all efforts, interagency cooperation still needs to be further developed, although some improvements were made: a couple of interagency structures were introduced and implemented.<sup>3</sup> For the purpose of this research, the historical review will concentrate on developments regarding interagency coordination. Other developments, for instance the introduction of new management techniques or the use of information technology within the government, will be mentioned slightly or will be ignored as irrelevant for this research.

The historical review of developments can be split into five periods covering almost twenty years. Each period distinguishes itself by a central research theme during that period. The periods and their themes are:<sup>4</sup>

1. 1972-1977 Interagency allocation of duties and coordination
2. 1979-1981 Main structure of the public service
3. 1982-1986 Networking within and around the public service
4. 1987-1991 Organization and management of the government
5. 1991-1993 Focus on the core of the business

Each of these periods and their themes will be a separate subchapter in which the following items will be covered: (1) committee(s) and the aim of its or their research, (2) research method and the analysis, (3) conclusions, (4) recommendations, and (5) results.

Another subchapter will deal with the outcome of a report was that issued in 2000 in the aftermath of the Srebrenica-debacle and that contains some relevant aspects on interagency coordination. The answer to the question, How did the Netherlands deal with interagency cooperation? will conclude this chapter.

### 1972 to 1977: Interagency Allocation of Duties and Interagency Coordination

#### Committees and the Aim of Their Research

Three reports issued by their respective committees are particularly important in this period: (1) the report by the Committee Van Veen (1969-1972) in 1972, (2) the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid or WRR (The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy) in 1975, and (3) the Ministeriële Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie or MITACO (Ministerial Committee for Interagency Allocation of Duties and Coordination) in 1977. All of these committees aimed at a better tuning of policy made by several governmental agencies.

#### Research Method and the Analysis

The committee Van Veen started in 1969 with making an inventory of the most important shortfalls and complaints in the allocation of duties between the governmental agencies and the coordination between these agencies.<sup>5</sup> A central problem for the WRR, a little later, was how to improve the allocation of duties and the coordination.<sup>6</sup> The MITACO did both and based its research on the work done by the two previous committees. This committee tried to sum up advantages and disadvantages of changes in the status quo. The scope of this research was reasonably limited; only the shortfalls were investigated, not the entire governmental

organization.<sup>7</sup> The research approach towards the problem was a practical one; it was based on the existing complaints and known shortfalls in the public service. The committees hardly used any theorem.

### Conclusions

Generally, the analyses of the problems led to the conclusion that the allocation of duties did not match with the environment in which the government operated at that time. Besides that, the committees concluded that possibilities to coordinate between the agencies were very limited. The final conclusion was that the political leaders and the leading officials in the public service were getting overloaded, because primarily at that (high) organizational level most of the interagency efforts took place. The committees regarded the introduction of a new model for coordination as most important to solve the problems. That model was introduced and described in chapter one.

More specifically, the conclusions of the committees, in terms of interagency coordination, were the following:

1. Common was the complaint that certain areas of governmental responsibilities were spread over several ministries. For that reason many communication and coordination problems existed, some duties were executed twice, and the decision-making process was considerably slow.<sup>8</sup>

2. Many coordination problems occurred because the different levels of government (local, national, and international, i.e., mainly Europe), because of duties intertwined between local and national authorities and similarly, because of the European integration between national and international authorities. Consequently, the ministries developed their own course without taking into account the guidelines from other, higher levels of governing authority.<sup>9</sup>

3. As a result, most of the coordination problems needed to be solved higher in the governmental organization. Because of the congestion at that level, there was no time available

for coordination, which worsened the problems: (1) policymaking was conducted less effectively, (2) the ministerial responsibility towards both chambers was, and (3) it was harder to establish clear future ends to be achieved (a strategic view or long term policy).<sup>10</sup>

4. Several trends and developments in society had led to a much bigger, more complex, and more expensive government. As a result, the conduct of its operations was much more laborious. Servants complained about unclear and overlapping duties and responsibilities, and an increased competence between agencies and ministries could be noticed. A systematic inventory of government duties and responsibilities was missing. Criteria and standards for an interagency allocation of duties were absent. The organization and structure of the government was not transparent and therefore, so concluded the committee, the democratic control was hampered.<sup>11</sup>

5. The possibilities for the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance--who both play an important coordinating role in the Cabinet of Ministers--were limited, because these officials did not have authority over the other ministries. Besides that, the instructions issued by a coordinating minister were too unclear to the other ministries to enable an easy implementation.<sup>12</sup>

### Recommendations

The major recommendations from the parliamentary committees in this period were that continuously the government would have to adjust the allocation of duties and responsibilities between the ministries in order to reduce the need for coordination. The idea was that closely related duties, which require the most coordination, had to be organized in one agency on a hierarchical level as low as possible.<sup>13</sup> Yet, coordination between the ministries was perceived as key for a well-performing government, whatever the organizational changes were to be.<sup>14</sup> The environment would keep on changing more quickly and the problems of the modern society would become more complex, therefore the interdependence between ministries and agencies would increase and several ministries and agencies would need to be involved with certain

issues.<sup>15</sup> The most important and concrete outcome of the studies of this period was, as a result, a new coordination model.<sup>16</sup>

The coordination model that has been described in more detail in chapter one, page 2 and 3 consisted a set of organizational tools in which the coordination had to be arranged. This model consisted of councils on several hierarchical levels (from the council of ministers, via under boards, to councils on different levels in the public service) and other coordinating measures (like coordinating ministers and the introduction of central policy directorates in several ministries). To support the introduction of this new model, the committees recommended the use of scientific research and as a result from that recommendation (by the Committee Van Veen), the WRR was established.<sup>17</sup>

### Results

Large parts of the proposed coordination model were introduced in the public service in the early 1970s.<sup>18</sup> Subsequent committees, however, concluded that these measures were insufficient to solve all of the problems concerning the coordination between the ministries. Shortcomings arose on the level of the council of ministers, the under boards, and the administrative support by the public service. The idea of the coordinating minister did not work very well either.<sup>19</sup> The system of the coordination model grew uncontrollably and reorganization and downsizing therefore became necessary. Recommendations to solve these problems included reduction of the size of councils, to start with the council of ministers and secondly, the reduction of the number of the duties and responsibilities for the individual minister and state-secretary. Finally, the downsizing of the number and size of interagency committees were recommended.<sup>20</sup>



## 1979 to 1981: Main Structure of the Public Service

### Committee and the Aim of Its research

In this period mainly the reports by the Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst or CHR (Committee Main Structure of the Public Service) were important. The CHR--also known as the Committee Vonhoff--produced three reports in 1980 and a final report in 1981. This committee aimed at an improved interconnection within the government and the public service.

### The Research Method and the Analysis

The point of departure for the CHR was the unbalance in governmental involvement in society. In one occasion the government ruled too much and too rigid whereas in other occasions there was a need for stronger governing but the government hardly acted. The central problem for the CHR was therefore the disconnect between the governmental system (which was founded 130 years earlier) and the--changed--modern society and its increasing demands and complex problems.

In order to study the main structure of the public service, the CHR explored several focal points to analyze: (1) parts of a ministry, (2) entire ministries, (3) the public service as a whole, (4) the entire administration, or even (5) the Dutch societal system. The CHR chose the public service as the subject for their research.<sup>21</sup> This implied that all other political-administrative aspects as well as the Dutch societal system were considered as the environment. The CHR projected the interaction between public service and its environment as systems and processes. The interaction was the input and output of the system. The throughput was the processes that occurred within (the individual ministries of) the public service.<sup>22</sup>

In their projection of governmental processes the CHR considered three aspects as input: observation, selection, and canalization of policy issues. The need for governing, the instruments for governing, and the program for governing were considered as output. Throughput in this projection included the acknowledgement of the observed issues (required: anticipation by the

government), an efficient integration of the selected and canalized requested facts (required: an interrelated and well-balanced governmental policy), and the availability of governmental tools or instruments (required: a flexible and professional government).<sup>23</sup> The CHR described and analyzed the public service through this systematical projection.

### Conclusions

Criteria were needed to step up from description and analysis to conclusions. The criteria the CHR chose were mainly aimed at the throughput-part of the processes (the activity within the government). These criteria were: (1) interconnection (between the government's policy and activity), (2) the ability to govern, and (3) flexibility.<sup>24</sup> In other words, for the CHR these were the criteria that would lead to improving the performance of the public service.<sup>25</sup>

The CHR concluded that government and public service consisted of two worlds, the world of compartmentalization and the world of integration.<sup>26</sup> They found out that compartmentalization existed on the lower hierarchical levels of the public service (bottom-up) and that this was a strong world. At that level, issues were pretty simple, the required duties and responsibilities were available within a limited part of the organization (an organization that was reasonably independent). The world of compartmentalization was described as a world of close-circuits.

On the other hand, the world of integration on the other hand, existed predominantly in the higher echelons of the public service and the government. This world was perceived as weak. At this level issues were complex and the way to solve these difficult problems was mainly sought through trying to connect the involved agencies and ministries. In this world relations would change quickly and at the same time and continually a competition for power was going on. Structures were vague and the power of the government considerably weak.

The CHR concluded that the connection between these two worlds happened primarily through the highest levels of the ministries. On the lower levels the fine-tuning of policy with

other actors was seen as less important than to satisfy public servants in the own compartment. It was clear that the world of compartmentalization nearly always triumphed over the world of integration and thus an anticipating, interrelated, well-balanced and flexible government hardly existed. This conclusion led to the following proposals for improvement.

### Recommendations

The proposals for improving the performance of the government were numerous. The most important ones regarding interagency cooperation were:<sup>27</sup>

1. Set up five main areas of policy (social-economic affairs; governmental and judicial affairs; social-cultural affairs; housing, spatial planning, and environmental affairs; and--last but not least--international and security affairs). An overall and broad policy in these five areas had to lead the rest of the administration and public service.

2. Once the central guidance would have been issued, the number and size of the councils, boards, and interagency committees on all levels of the administration could be downsized (there would be a lesser need for interagency coordination).

3. Increase the government's capability to reorganize itself and increase its flexibility.

4. Increase the mobility of personnel within the government and the public service in order to develop a human resource in the organization with a broader view on policy issues in general.

Political commitment was essential for the success of the required changes. The top authorities in the public service had to drive this plan.

### Results

Although the CHR had spent a lot of time and money on the reports, which were based on solid (scientific) research, and nearly everyone involved acknowledged their conclusions and recommendations, the implementation of the plan failed almost completely. The main reasons for

the failure were a lack of political commitment and a resistance to change within the public service. Thereafter, governmental officials stuck to their positions, having too much influence and power to change. Finally, this failure raised the question whether the process of change within the government itself had to be changed.<sup>28</sup>

### 1982 to 1986: Networking Within and Around the Public Service

#### Committee and the Aim of Its Research

In the early and mid-1980s a financial-economic crisis hit the Netherlands hard. As a reaction an attitude of no-nonsense was fashionable, seen as necessary to solve problems as unemployment, budget deficiencies, and a rapidly increasing national debt. The failure of the outcome of the previous CHR reports had a sobering effect that suited this attitude. There was a broad understanding that everything had been said and had been researched. Now it was time to do something; pragmatism was the key.<sup>29</sup>

In 1981 Mr. Tjeenk Willink was appointed as the Regeringscommissaris voor de Reorganisatie van de Rijksdienst or RRR (Governmental Commissar for the Reorganization of the Public Service). In the years he was in office he issued several annual reports in which problems were identified and (pragmatic) solutions were recommended. The main aim of the RRR was to improve the flexibility of the government and the public service. The RRR officially had to continue the work of the CHR, but--in fact--hardly used the outcome of that committee's reports.<sup>30</sup>

#### The Research Method and the Analysis

The RRR were the networks in and around the government. The research aimed at the relations and connections between the (governmental) actors and the regulations that were applicable to these connections.

The RRR chose for a research model in which the governmental organization was viewed as a wide variety of smaller organizations and actors that constantly needed to negotiate with different actors on different levels to get results (i.e., an effective policy). The assumption was made that the chances for a positive outcome would be high, if these negotiations (which could occur within but primarily between the ministries [interagency contacts]) were regulated and well defined. After all, through the negotiations all actors would be able to influence the outcome of a policymaking process. If, however, the regulations were unclear, the negotiations could easily degenerate into bureau-political conflicts, which would be counterproductive and would affect the governmental performance.<sup>31</sup>

Last but not least, the RRR approached the problem in the analysis incrementally. The project was split up in 23 subprojects (categorized in five groups) of which at least seven dealt with interagency matters. Noteworthy is the fact that some of the issues had been dealt with in previous periods. The seven issues are:<sup>32</sup>

In order to streamline the public service:

1. Reduction of the number of coordinating ministers and project ministers.
2. Reduction of the system of external organizations for advice.
3. Reduction of the system of interagency committees.
4. Rearrangement of the ministries (as agreed with the formation of the cabinet in 1982).

In order to increase the dynamics of the personnel:

5. Stimulation of the job mobility for public servants.

In order to improve management:

6. Reinforcement of the coordination within and between the ministries.
7. The introduction of training programs for managers.

There was no real top-down master plan in which all separate projects had to fit. Progress was to be made realistically: step by step--often bottom-up--at a speed dependent on the situation, the organization, the people, or the opportunity for change. The RRR focused more on the feasibility of solutions than on the introduction of a new theorem for a governmental system.<sup>33</sup>

### Conclusions and Recommendations

According to the RRR the majority of the problems occurred, because the above-mentioned network did not work optimally. The RRR observed the following shortfalls:

1. In the governmental networks the most powerful actors dominated the weaker actors. Actors tended to trick and deceive each other. Often rivalry occurs and between the actors there was sometimes an atmosphere of contrasts, friction and conflicts. It seemed that much was allowed to attain the own objectives. This situation had been possible to come into being due to a lack of regulations and rules for interagency coordination or the observance of those regulations.<sup>34</sup>

2. The solution for coordination problems was not necessarily reorganization. If the contrast between the actors remained the same, the same friction could be expected and thus the reorganization would have been executed in vain.<sup>35</sup>

3. The attitude towards IWGs was ambivalent. There was a lot of criticism; on the other hand the government could not do without. The negative aspects that were found were that those committees: (1) were used to delay the issuing of new policies, (2) made officials aware that they could withdraw from their responsibilities and hide behind these committees, or (3) could include or exclude critical people with a project (in order to silence them). Interagency committees were affected negatively by this attitude.<sup>36</sup>

4. Another problem was the indistinctiveness of the 'rules of the game' in negotiations between actors. As stated in the first of these conclusions, there was lack of a clear set of rules that allowed conflicts, rivalry and friction to happen.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the rules and regulations for

consultations within and between ministries had to be further explained and amended in order to provide a clear set of principles for all actors involved in the interagency or intra-agency process.<sup>38</sup>

5. Another recommendation was application of a general principle to keep the coordination as low in the hierarchy as possible. That would lead to (quicker) decisions on a lower hierarchical level in the government on issues of coordination and therefore to less (later) discussion in councils higher in the organization.<sup>39</sup> The only disadvantage of this approach was that lower authorities would have increased power, because they would be the official that would have all the information available and they would be the ones to decide whether information would be sent higher in the organization or not.<sup>40</sup>

## Results

The RRR was successful in accomplishing some of the subprojects. Each subproject was regarded as significant as long as it contributed to the process of improvement of the government (taking into account the no-nonsense mentality, the pragmatism, and the social-economic crisis at that time). In the long term, however, the lack of a master plan or overall blueprint turned out to be counterproductive and not as much was achieved as probably would have been possible.<sup>41</sup>

### 1987 to 1991: Organization and Management of the Government

#### Committees and the Aim of Their Research

Between 1987 and 1991 the research was aimed at a more efficient government. Several working groups--of which the Committee Verbaan is the best known--reconsidered the performance of the government. The basic ideas derived from the scientific field of business administration, based on the assumption that the governmental organization could be run and managed as a business. Key thoughts were ideas and concepts such as efficiency, lean organizations, privatization, budgets and budgeteering, management contracts, and

decentralization, partly as a result of the same no-nonsense mentality as present in the previous period. Cost control within the government was the main driver behind all these initiatives.<sup>42</sup>

In this period integration of GOs and interagency cooperation between those organizations were not focal point and therefore mainly outside the scope of this research project. Therefore, outcome of the analysis and research method, conclusions, recommendations and results of the research in this period are irrelevant for this thesis will and will not be further addressed.

### 1991 to 1993: Focus on the Core of the Business

#### Committee and the Aim of Its Research

In 1993 the Vierde Externe Commissie Staatskundige, Bestuurlijke en Staatsrechtelijke Vernieuwing (Fourth External Committee for Governmental, Administrative, and Constitutional Renewal) or Committee Wiegel reported their conclusions to the Parliament. This committee aimed at an increase of the quality of the governmental performance. Their solutions were not so much another new plan; it was merely directed to a further evolution of the governmental organization, policies, and culture, as it had existed to that point of time. In short: evolution instead of revolution.

Differently than the previous committees they viewed the government in broader terms. A public service with its tasks, duties and responsibilities and above that the political level (the administration), which decided what these tasks, duties and responsibilities, had to be. They acknowledged that especially the latter level brought extra dynamics into the governmental organization (which had quite often not much to do with rational decision-making). This level also influenced to a substantial degree the outcome of the governmental organization.



## The Analysis and Research Method

The Committee Wiegel focused on possibilities to further improve the performance of the government. In order to find these possibilities they chose a pragmatic and differentiated approach. This meant that the Committee did not focus on just one method of analysis or one theory; instead, they built upon existing knowledge, the outcome of recent research, as well as advise and proposals made by previous committees.

To do so, the Committee Wiegel conducted their survey from three different perspectives. First, the committee did an historical analysis to find out what the previous committees had concluded and to what extend their proposals had been implemented. Secondly, they made a snapshot of different fields of the governmental organization to have a clear picture where the government stood at that time. Thirdly, they took into account existing projects that ran at that time to improve the government in order to avoid confusion in the organization after issuing new plans for reorganization. Based on this survey and the analysis, they came up with a time-activity plan.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

From a historical point of view the Committee Wiegel concluded that the support in the public service for another report was very little. Too many reports in recent years had been issued, too few ideas were implemented, or too few ideas led to significant improvements. Accordingly, the committee realized that it had to be very pragmatic in their recommendations and that these recommendations had not only to be implemented incrementally, but they had to correspond to current reorganization projects too.<sup>43</sup>

The snapshot the committee made of the government led to the conclusion that many ideas, derived from the business administration (like decentralization, improved accountability, contract-management, working in projects, et cetera), had been implemented. Managing the government was much more the case then leading a governmental organization. Another

conclusion was that increasingly there emerged differentiation between governmental organizations, instead of one big governmental machine that approaches problems and issues in the same way.<sup>44</sup> The Committee Wiegel saw this as a positive prerequisite for further improvements.

In the third part of their analysis, the committee searched for connection between their research and other ongoing projects to improve the government. This led to the conclusion that first of all "Europe" had become more influential in national politics and governing than many public servants (and politicians too) thought. The committee concluded that this would require an intensive vertical interagency coordination effort (between national officials and the 'European' officials in Brussels) in order to be as influential as possible in this international arena and to compensate the obvious decrease of national sovereignty. Secondly, other projects and research had issued the idea that the ministries should focus on their core business--the formulation of policy--and that they should not be involved in the execution of the policy.<sup>45</sup>

The Committee Wiegel came up with four major recommendations:<sup>46</sup>

1. Rearrangement of tasks and responsibilities within or between of the ministries was not necessary, because the coordination had to be done anyway whether it was through interagency coordination or intra-agency coordination. The committee concluded that the presumption that the need for coordination would be lower if the governmental organization was arranged in another way had not necessarily to be true.<sup>47</sup>

2. The building of core ministries that primarily aimed at making policy had to be continued. All other--more executive governmental--tasks could be carried out by decentralized, privatized agencies that would work outside the administration. Consequently, the administration could be reduced to a smaller organization of 10,000 to 15,000 public servants and would thus be more flexible, more responsive, and better suited in order to govern more effectively. The

committee also concluded that an increased vertical interagency coordination would be required to make this system work.

3. Continuation of the efforts to improve the quality of governmental personnel would be required, especially for officials on the management level.

4. Introduction of a project minister was necessary as an important means to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of the government. This would provide the cabinet a means to work on a priority issue. The committee also concluded that there were some measures required to make this proposal successful. The most important one was that the project minister would need to have a mandate and authority over parts of several other ministries in order to manage his project. Optimal interagency coordination and cooperation would also be an important prerequisite. Next, a clear agreement would be necessary on aims of the project, ways, and means. Finally, a separate budget would be required.

In two of the four proposals the Committee Wiegel emphasized the need for interagency coordination. They perceived interagency coordination not as an objective or an end, but as an essential way to get to the objective. Throughout their report many aspects of interagency coordination were highlighted. Therefore, the next paragraph will give a summary of relevant aspects regarding interagency coordination as viewed by the Committee Wiegel:

1. Interagency coordination was still a permanent and crucial prerequisite to make the government effective, especially if the government would move towards decentralization. That would increase the need for (vertically) interagency coordination. This needs had been underscored by the increasing influence of the international arena (i.e., Europe) in domestic affairs.<sup>[48]</sup>

2. The committee viewed, however, interagency coordination as a normal task for a governmental organization to be executed and the committee concluded that the means for interagency coordination were sufficient, although they acknowledges that there wee some

problems. Therefore, the Committee Wiegel did not recommend any additional organizational measures to improve the interagency coordination.

### 2000: The Committee Bakker

#### Committee and the Aim of Its Research

In the aftermath of the Srebrenica-debacle many investigations under the supervision of the Parliament were conducted. The results of all these efforts led quite often to many more questions and investigations. The end of all debates and discussion is not to be expected in the near future. After parliamentary deliberations, early 1999, the Parliament decided to analyze the political decision-making prior and during the participation of Dutch troops in PSO. The Parliament named the Tijdelijke Commissie voor Buitenlandse Uitzendingen (Temporary Committee for International Missions), in short: the Committee Bakker, to execute this task. The Committee Bakker aimed to improve political decision-making in view of future participation of the Netherlands in PSO.<sup>49</sup>

The report they issued--the most recent and most influential one on this subject to date--is significant for this research, because it covered the issue of interagency coordination at least partially. The remarks of the Committee Bakker on this issue provided insight to what extent the recommendations, ideas, and suggestions of previous committees had been implemented. A second reason why this report is interesting is the subject of the research: it dealt an international affairs' issue, which is the limitation for this thesis.

#### The Research Method and the Analysis

The Parliament submitted to the Committee Bakker four research subjects to be considered:

1. To analyze the political decision-making including in any case the peace operations in former Yugoslavia

2. To organize public hearings with all--mainly governmental--officials involved
3. To evaluate the political Framework of Evaluation (*Toetsings kader*)<sup>50</sup>
4. To report to the Parliament on these three items

The research method of the committee included literature and file study as well as public hearings. They categorized their research in the following themes: (1) initiative and motives for participation in missions abroad, (2) criteria, (3) information (needed for the political decision-making), (4) the environment and influence on the political decision-making, (5) an assessment of risks, and (6) lessons-learned of earlier (international) missions.<sup>51</sup>

### Conclusions and Recommendations

Related to interagency coordination the major remarks of the Committee Bakker were the following:<sup>52</sup>

1. The exchange of information between the involved ministries was sufficient under normal conditions. In key moments as well as in crisis situations the committee concluded that there was a major shortfall.
2. Many times there was an informal exchange of information. This led to a lack of transparency and incompletely informed officials.
3. The political decision ultimately has to be made in the Council of Ministers, but the committee reported that this council often delegated hard and difficult multi-agency decisions to just the--one to three--ministers that were most directly involved.
4. The committee concluded that sometimes during the preparation of a mission--and a political decision as well--coordination problems occurred. To prevent these problems from occurring, sometimes an ad hoc Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established. An example for that is the IWG Kosovo during the NATO Operation Allied Force.
5. Rivalry between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense did sometimes occur.

6. Although the contribution to some missions was far above what could be expected, the Netherlands had few means to influence the international decision-making process because it did not participate in important boards such as the Contact Group for former Yugoslavia.

7. In preparation of political decision an assessment of the risks had to be made. Usually, however, no integral assessment was available; the involved ministries would all issue a separate one.

8. The same was applicable to the Framework of Evaluation. Different ministries explained and applied the criteria in different ways.

9. The Framework of Evaluation applied primarily to military operations. For civilian missions most of the same criteria would be applicable (like a mission for a police force). Outside the Ministry of Defense, hardly any other ministry would use the Framework.

10. The committee concluded that more agreements and coordination between the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and General Affairs would be required.<sup>53</sup> The Interagency Consultation for Peace Missions (in which these three ministries are involved) should have to have a more coordinating role (which it obviously did not have so far).

11. Closer coordination between the Ministries of State and Defense was also required as well as a closer coordination within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

12. International accords with major contributing countries (like the U.S., the UK, Germany or France) were made prior to a PSO, but during the mission quite often these nations did not live up to these agreements. In the Netherlands these agreements were not observed closely enough either. In the case of an emergency it then would be too late to react. Therefore, the information exchange and other connections between the Netherlands and the other nations should be maintained during the (easier phases of a) mission too.

## Results

It is hard to draw overall conclusions on the effectiveness of the outcome of the report of the Committee Bakker, but the political decision-making on the UN peace mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) between October and December 2000 was heavily influenced by the contents of it. For a few members of Parliament this report provided even the arguments to believe that the Netherlands should not participate in UN-missions at all anymore.

Another relevant reaction of this report was suggestion made by the biggest party in the Parliament, the *Partij van de Arbeid* (Labor Party) or PvdA. The PvdA plead for establishing of an Interagency Bureau for Peace Operations in which the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and General Affairs should cooperate.<sup>54</sup>

## Summary and Conclusion

Interagency coordination seems like an eternal problem for governmental organizations.<sup>55</sup> Governmental organizations are complex and the number of tasks huge. An issue is usually related to other issues, most of the times responsibilities spread over other parts of the government. Therefore, coordination is required to issue consistent policies and to be able to synchronize a broad range of closely related activities. For the Dutch government (as for all other governments) interagency coordination is the key for a well-performing government and public service and is therefore a critical link in governmental processes,<sup>56</sup> but yet a normal task for the government.

Although in recent years the improvement of the governmental performance also has been sought in other fields of governing, there is still much to improve regarding interagency coordination. Committees throughout the last decades have drawn this conclusion, but the implementation of all recommendations and advice has been limited.<sup>57</sup> The most recent report revealed new shortfalls and emphasized some of the old shortfalls regarding interagency cooperation.

A summary of the major (older and more recent) problems considering interagency coordination shows the following nineteen major flaws in the governmental system categorized as organizational shortfalls, shortfalls regarding policy, and institutional cultural shortfalls (although some of the shortfalls could arguably be grouped in another category):

Organizationally:

1. IWGs do not always exist institutionally where they might have been expected.
2. Shortfalls exist in the information exchange and other connections between the Netherlands and other nations in case of an (international) emergency.
3. The size of governmental organizations and the span of control of its managers tend to grow uncontrollably, which increases the need for interagency coordination as a second order effect.
4. A closer coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense is required.
5. A lack of training of the governmental officials can be observed, which affects--among other things--the interagency coordination.
6. The monitoring of the implementation of (interagency) policy is insufficient.
7. Coordinating officials suffer from a lack of authority in an IWG.

In terms of policy:

8. The Netherlands has not been able to participate in international political decision-making process, because there is a lack of a focused approach by the government--and therefore the governmental agencies--to identify achievable objectives.
9. A need has been identified to tune policies made by several ministries in a better manner.
10. IWGs do not coordinate sufficiently enough.



11. Assessments are made separately in cases that the (complex) situation required an integral approach.

12. In some occasions, the way policies, standards, and criteria are applied differ per ministry.

13. Clear mandates and a clear set of rules for the IWGs do not always exist (or regulations for the observance of those rules) for those governmental officials that are involved in the interagency coordination.

14. Different agencies have different objectives in a certain situation.

Institutional-Culturally:

15. Difficult decisions are not always made by the entire IWG or Board, the members instead let the specialists solve the (complex) problem. This can lead to problems considering responsibility and accountability.

16. Ministries are reluctant to use other ministries (proven) standards and policy.

17. The exchange of information occurs informally instead using formal mechanisms.

18. Occasionally rivalry exists to an extent that it could be counterproductive for the overall performance of the government.

19. Sometimes IWGs are used for bureau-political games.

Besides the flaws that derive from a historical overview, trends for solutions can be identified too. Examples are:

1. Increase flexibility within the government

2. Enhance job mobility of governmental personnel

3. Train (the management skills of) governmental personnel. Continually, governmental managers need to further improve their knowledge and experience through cross training and a more flexible career path.

4. Reduce the size of the government, the number of IWGs, the span of control of governmental officials, et cetera

Noteworthy is the fact that reorganization is obviously not the primary answer to solve coordination problems. The past shows that after radical reorganization often the same problem still existed. In short, a successful reorganization is easier said than done.

To conclude this chapter two questions need to be answered. First, the answer to the question, How did the Dutch government deal with interagency cooperation? can be answered as not good enough. The answer to the question, What are currently the shortfalls regarding interagency coordination within in the Dutch government? can be answered with stating that--referring to the abovementioned list of major flaws--there remains enough to be improved. In order to make these steps, the other part of the comparison--a historical analysis of the U.S. to create interagency structures and policy--must be put in. Chapter five will make that historical analysis and will also make the comparison between the U.S. developments in the past and the current Dutch situation.

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<sup>1</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 9.

<sup>2</sup> G. H. J. M. Neelen, M. R. Rutgers, and M. E. Tuurenhout, *De bestuurlijke kaart van Nederland: Het openbaar bestuur en zijn omgeving in nationaal en internationaal perspectief* (Leiden University, 1999), 79-80.

<sup>3</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 59, states that an example is the relation between the State Ministry and the Ministry for Development Coordination a couple of years ago. Regularly, the political, governmental and financial intertwining led to tensions between the two ministries. The integration of policy in the field of Development Coordination, a considerable reduction in the overhead could be realized and the competing situation between two agencies could be solved.

<sup>4</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 104.

<sup>5</sup> Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie, *Bestuursorganisatie bij de kabinetsformatie 1971* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1972), 12.

<sup>6</sup> Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur. Enkele aspecten, knelpunten en voorstellen* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1975), 9.

<sup>7</sup> Report of the Ministeriële Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie (MITACO), *Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie*, Tweede Kamer, session 1977, numbers 14649/1-2, 7.

<sup>8</sup> Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie, *Bestuursorganisatie bij de kabinetsformatie 1971* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1972), 13.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur. Enkele aspecten, knelpunten en voorstellen* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1975), 49.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

<sup>13</sup> Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie, *Bestuursorganisatie bij de kabinetsformatie 1971* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1972), 62.

<sup>14</sup> Report of the Ministeriële Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie (MITACO), *Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie*, Tweede Kamer, session 1977, numbers 14649/1-2, 13.

<sup>15</sup> Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur. Enkele aspecten, knelpunten en voorstellen* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1975), 51.

<sup>16</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 75.

<sup>17</sup> Commissie Interdepartementale Taakverdeling en Coördinatie, *Bestuursorganisatie bij de kabinetsformatie 1971* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1972), 26.

<sup>18</sup> Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur. Enkele aspecten, knelpunten en voorstellen* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1975), 138.

<sup>19</sup> Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst, *Eindadvies* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1981), 92-100, 145-148.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 137-156.

<sup>21</sup> Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst, *Weinigen denken dat het goed gaat. Rapport nr. 2* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1980), 22-25.

<sup>22</sup> Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst, *Zou Thorbecke nu tevreden zijn? Rapport nr. 1* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1979), 34.

<sup>23</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen – Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 79.

<sup>24</sup> For the Committee Vonhoff "the ability to govern" included (1) the ability to prioritize problems, duties, et cetera and (2) the solution of those problems. In short: (crisis) decision-making.

<sup>25</sup> Commissie Hoofdstructuur Rijksdienst, *Elk kent de laan, die derwaart gaat. Rapport nr. 3* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1980), 83.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 14 and 84.

<sup>27</sup> R. W. van der Valk, *Organisatieveranderingen in de rijksdienst* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1985), 164.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 165-166.

<sup>29</sup> H. J. M. Broekhuysen, "Vonhoff, Rietkerk en de 24 projecten," *Bestuur*, no. 1 (1984), 5-9.

<sup>30</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 90-91.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 89-90.

<sup>34</sup> Regeringscommissie Reorganisatie Rijksdienst, *Jaarbericht 1986* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1986), 9.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>36</sup> R. H. P. W. Kottman, *Interdepartementale coördinatie, rapport over een onderzoek naar structuur en functionaren van de interdepartementale coördinatie, achtergrondstudie nr. 7* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1981), 13.

<sup>37</sup> H. D. Tjeenk Willink, *De kwaliteit van de overheid. Een bijdrage aan het hernieuwde politieke debat* (The Hague: 1989), 17.

<sup>38</sup> H. D. Tjeenk Willink, *Regeren in een dubbelrol rapport over een studie naar de marges voor een samenhangend overheidsbeleid, achtergrondstudie nr.1* (The Hague: 1980), 46-48.

<sup>39</sup> R. H. P. W. Kottman, *Interdepartementale coördinatie, rapport over een onderzoek naar structuur en functionaren van de interdepartementale coördinatie, achtergrondstudie nr. 7* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1981), 9-10.

<sup>40</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 94.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>42</sup> Interdepartementale heroverwegingswerkgroep (Commissie Verbaan), *Zelfbeheer 1, Heroverwegingsrapport verbetering bedrijfsvoering overheid* (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij, 1983), 10.

<sup>43</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 9-11.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 12-14.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 15-19.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 3-6.

<sup>47</sup> The last departmental rearrangement happened in 1983 when the two ministries VROM and WVC emerged. It turned out that the organizational benefits could not weigh up against the costs, time, and energy that had to be spent to make the transition work.

<sup>48</sup> The horizontal coordination is the regular coordination between different agencies; the vertical coordination is required because of the more independent position of that agency (for

instance, the agency can be privatized). Vertical coordination is then required between the higher policy-level and the lower execution-level.

<sup>49</sup> Tijdelijke Commissie Buitenlandse Uitzendingen, Tweede Kamer Session 1999-2000, 26454, nrs. 7-8, *Rapport* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 2000), 9.

<sup>50</sup> The Framework of Evaluation was created in July 1995 in order to structure the debates between cabinet and parliament regarding the Dutch participation in missions abroad as well as to guarantee the quality of the political decision-making on this subject. The Framework consists of fourteen criteria, concerning two major questions: (1) Is the operation politically desirable and acceptable, and (2) is the operation militarily feasible and suitable?

<sup>51</sup> Tijdelijke Commissie Buitenlandse Uitzendingen, Tweede Kamer Session 1999-2000, 26454, nrs. 7-8, *Rapport* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 2000), 13

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 479-492.

<sup>53</sup> The Ministry of General Affairs is the--comparatively small--ministry of the Prime-Minister.

<sup>54</sup> NOS Teletext (Television Textpages) page 106, *Reactie rapport Commissie Bakker* (Comments on Report Committee Bakker), 4 September 2000; available from <http://teletekst.nos.nl/cgi-bin/tt/nos/page/t/m/106>; accessed 4 September 2000.

<sup>55</sup> U. Rosenthal, *Openbaar bestuur: Beleid, Oranisatie en Politiek* (Alphen aan de Rijn: 1996), 228-229.

<sup>56</sup> Commissie Wiegel, *Naar kerndepartementen: Kiezen voor een hoogwaardige en flexibele rijksdienst* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 18 and 21.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE NECESSITY OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION: THE U.S. AND THE NETHERLANDS

#### Introduction

After having identified the status of interagency coordination in the Netherlands, this chapter first will analyze the American evolution in this field. Three important, interagency coordination related, policy documents will be the subject of this analysis: the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA-47); the Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) of 1997, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*; and the Joint Pub 3-08 *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* of 1996. The analysis will focus on the reasons behind these documents and answer the question, Why was it necessary to formulate policy and doctrine regarding interagency coordination?

The first document--generally considered as the root of interagency coordination--aimed at better coordination between the governmental agencies and described methods, systems and organizations to improve coordination. The second document--established through a interagency process and describing that interagency process--has been seen as the "mother of all modern PDDs."<sup>1</sup> The last, another recently issued document--the Joint Pub 3-08, consists of the JCS chairman's guidelines for the conduct of interagency coordination by the U.S. Armed Forces. Although this document addresses interagency coordination at the operational level, it also relates it to the strategic political or national level and clarifies the armed forces' role in the interagency coordination at that level.

The second step of the research in this chapter will be the comparison between the U.S. reasons for interagency cooperation and the shortfalls in the Dutch governmental system, as identified in the previous chapter. The question is, Are the same reasons applicable for the Dutch government in the early twenty-first century as they applied to the U.S. Government (USG) in the

last decades? The research will identify the differences and similarities. If there are enough similarities between the--partially historical--U.S.-situation and the Dutch situation at present (and the answer on the last question is yes or might be), then the next chapter will reveal elements that might be useful to consider as a solution in the Dutch situation.

#### Why Did the U.S. Need Interagency Coordination--NSA-47

##### What Is the NSA-47

The National Security Act of 26 July 1947 (Public Law 80 [253]) institutionalized the coordination of foreign and defense policy as part of the reorganization of the American national security apparatus. It also aimed at the reconciliation of the diplomatic and military commitments and requirements. The NSA-47 provided a set of executive institutions to manage and coordinate national security policy making. The National Security Council (NSC), as a presidential staff, was created by this act as well as other national security elements, such as the Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Military Establishment (NME) (prior to the unification of the three services), and the JCS. Two elements in the NSA-47 are key: national security and interagency coordination.<sup>2</sup>

##### What Induced NSA-47

The NSA-47 was a direct consequence of the events of World War II and the period prior to the war. Already in 1937, following the Japanese invasion of China, President Franklin D. Roosevelt saw the strategic vulnerability of America; America's vital interests were at stake. Roosevelt foresaw that the geographic isolation would cease to exist within a couple of years due to the rapidly improving technologies of airpower. An increase in the preparedness of the armed forces had to compensate the coming end of America's relative geographical invulnerability. Besides that, America had to deal with the upcoming totalitarian regimes with dictators who were able to react much more quickly and aggressively in foreign affairs than the Chief Executive of a



democratic governmental system. Therefore, Roosevelt aimed at a slow transition from a neutral state to a more militarily prepared nation, a nation that would focus on national security.<sup>3</sup>

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor accelerated this transition process. Suddenly national security--a definition not commonly used before that event--was key in America's foreign policy making. All the instruments of power had to be deployed and coordination was required to obtain a coherent and effective security policy. There was a need for an integrated policy that orchestrated the efforts of individual departments, and the White House seemed to be the most appropriate institution to lead the national security system, because national security was and is, according to Lieutenant-colonel (LTC) Christopher C. Shoemaker, "in nature an overarching, interdisciplinary paradigm embracing elements and responsibilities of a number of departments in a dynamic relationship."<sup>4</sup> Supported by a new field of study called public administration, the national security system would make the U.S. a competitive player against the evil empires in both East and West.

Accordingly, from that point of time and because of that time (in the middle of World War II), military advisers got an influential place at the top level of the government. Temporary wartime institutions such as the JCS (a copy of a similar counterpart in the British government), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a precursor of the CIA, and the State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) arose. They arose despite the fact the American people at that time, after having seen what had happened in other nations, were very suspicious of militarism.<sup>5</sup> In the years after the war, the American war society quickly returned to normality. Consequently, the relations within the NSC changed, too, the military community lost influence with regard to the civilian institutions.

After World War II, President Harry S. Truman realized that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the only superpowers. Germany and Japan were defeated and destroyed, the United Kingdom and France exhausted by the war. Unlike the aftermath of World War I, Truman

decided to keep the U.S. involved, aware of the fact that that course of action--isolationism and noninvolvement--ultimately led to World War II. In World War II the U.S. paid the price for not being involved. That same mistake could not be made again (although between 1945 and 1947 many Americans wanted to return to the prewar situation of an America not so much involved in global affairs). The other reason for staying involved was the behavior of the Soviet Union in the international arena. The Soviet Union soon turned out to be the antipode for the American values of democracy and capitalism. Two opposing ideologies were on the brink of a war, the Cold War, and Truman foresaw that Soviet-communism had to be contained.

To be able to cope with these threats, Truman realized that a new postwar foreign policy system had to replace the war institutions that were still in place, a system that had to be less militarily dominated. Although the military based Soviet Union had to be contained, Truman saw threats against vital interests no longer as just the foreign military power. Also challenging were a broader spectrum of threats like the international economic competition, the quick development of communications and transportation technology, north-south development issues, political pressure from international organizations, and many other issues. Agreeing that these challenges required an overarching governmental structure, directing the departments, the Congress approved his NSA-47.

The NSA-47 created a much encompassing, White House centered, management structure dealing with broadly defined national security matters. It also led to reorganization in the armed forces. A collective services approach had to lead to an organization that could address the challenges, which were basically the threats in the bipolar world. The establishment of the JCS and the unified commands were the main organizational results on the operational and military strategic level. Also significant was the creation of a Department of Defense (DOD) as an overarching department over the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the newly created Department of the Air Force.

The most important institution in the management structure was the NSC, which would have an advisory role and which had to coordinate and integrate all political and military questions regarding national security.<sup>6</sup> Truman also proposed that the NSC had to be the primary staff that would conduct crisis management for crises that could not be handled by one department or agency. He anticipated on the necessity to respond rapidly to any situation that would threaten the (vital) interests of America and created an active, coherent staff. Therefore, as Brzezinski--one of the later NSAs--would explain, "crisis management must stay in the White House [i.e. NSC]."<sup>7</sup>

The process to get the NSA-47--as Truman drafted it initially--approved, however, was a difficult one and many changes and compromises had to be made. To give an example of the resistance and the struggle: The Navy, a very powerful separate department in those days, initially, rejected the Army's urge for unification of the services successfully, ignoring the main argument, which was the necessity of unity of command and unity of effort from the top. The Navy preferred to have a less influential top structure. Therefore at first, as a compromise, the JCS for instance lacked a chairman to prevent a more powerful joint organization at the expense of the Navy institutional power. The same happened to the State Department that realized early that its influence had become much more marginalized after the creation of a NSC and a CIA. The Navy was also afraid for the general and indefinite powers of the Secretary of Defense under who the services would come. Another concern of the Navy was that there was not a mechanism fostering unity and teamwork. According to the Navy there was a lack of joint education and training, too. This all can be seen now as an institutional resistance towards change, since the Navy expected its influence to be diminished as a result of interagency coordination).

In a way the Navy fueled the integration of national security policy, trying to shift the focus from the threatening unification with the Army to integration of a higher level of policy making. The Navy argued that the unification of the armed forces was just a small part of the

required much broader approach towards this issue (that had to include, according to the Navy, foreign policy, defense, science, economic planning, and coordinated intelligence gathering).<sup>8</sup> Shortly after that, the Navy and the Army as well as the newcomer, the Air Force, would be unified under the DOD anyway.

In addition to the issue of national security, the second key element in the NSA-47 was coordination. From the coordination standpoint there were also reasons to come to this act. First of all, Truman realized that the complexity of issues required a strategic integration of the instruments of power; no national security matter or international affairs topic could be resolved any longer by one agency alone. He further realized that coherence would be necessary to be effective as a policy maker. Therefore, in his view, the interagency process was a logical way to apply the available means properly.<sup>9</sup> Again, World War II showed, for the first time, the effectiveness of this process, for instance in the field of gathering enormous quantities of intelligence or the integration of diplomacy and military power. Agencies and departments depended upon each other to increase the outcome of their organizations and therefore needed to work together. After the war, the importance of the interagency process grew further, because of America's active engagement in the world. In order to monitor the execution of the interagency process (as effective and efficient as possible), the NSC staff was given the responsibility for the administration, coordination, integration, and supervision of the process.<sup>10</sup>

In sum, considering cooperation and coordination, NSA-47 stimulated the intra-agency cooperation within the DOD, it furthered the interservice operations between Navy, Army, and Air Force, and it also promoted interagency coordination between the Departments related to foreign affairs. This leads to the next important step regarding the interagency process: PDD-56, President Clinton's *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*.

Why Did the U.S. Need Interagency  
Coordination--PDD-56

What Led to PDD-56

Until the late 1980s the bipolar balance of power existed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and disappearance of the communism the global security situation changed tremendously and although the national structure still functioned quite well, the U.S. involvement in the world changed. Starting in the early 1990s, the U.S. became increasingly involved in complex contingency operations (CCOs): these had to do with emergencies that "potentially could affect American interests" according to the National Security Advisor, Mr. Sandy Berger, in 1997.<sup>11</sup> Complex emergency is a term used by the World Conference on Religion and Peace to describe a humanitarian crisis that may involve armed conflict and could be exacerbated by natural disasters. It is a situation in which the prevailing conditions threaten the lives of a portion of the affected population who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to obtain the minimum subsistence requirements and are dependent on external humanitarian assistance.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. participated in a number of CCOs, such as Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq (1991), Operation Support Hope in Somalia (1994), and the CCO that induced directly PDD-56, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti (1994).

Lessons learned from those CCOs proved that the performance of the USG showed several deficiencies. The planning of the involved agencies was uncoordinated, and there were gaps and superfluous redundancies between civil and military planning efforts. Encompassing strategic goals and operational needs were seldom identified, and the synchronization of the agencies' efforts failed. Finally, an uncoordinated allocation of resources led often to a mismatch in the field. In short, the USG had to improve its (interagency planning) processes and the coordination between these processes.<sup>13</sup>

## What Is PDD-56

As a result of the aforementioned shortfalls, the Clinton administration designed PDD-56, which was issued in May 1997.<sup>14</sup> The idea behind the PDD was that effective interagency planning could ensure operational success. The PDD-56 aimed not only at shaping the outcome of the interagency process (i.e., a more effective performance of the USG in CCOs), but also at influencing the interagency process itself.

The PDD-56 intended to institutionalize interagency coordination mechanisms and planning tools in order to achieve unity of effort among USG agencies and other (international) organizations involved in CCOs. The PDD-56 suggested that a successful CCO requires an interagency system that addresses all aspects of the crisis--political, diplomatic, intelligence, security, humanitarian, and economic--in a coordinated fashion and nearly simultaneously. Therefore, the concept of PDD-56 provided an integrated political-military planning process and a set of related management tools to reduce confusion and delay and to eliminate redundancy between a wide variety of governmental organizations and agencies. With this system the government had to be able to get organized more efficiently by rapidly identifying and directing missions and tasks appropriate to each of the federal departments and agencies charged with responding to a complex emergency.<sup>15</sup>

In more into detail, the integrated political military planning process, as described by PPD-56, had to result in:

1. Clearer identification of tasks and missions for USG agencies
2. Development of one overarching strategy in order to resolve a crisis as early and as coherently as possible
3. An accelerated planning effort
4. Earlier implementation of civilian aspects of the operation

5. Earlier action on critical preparatory requirements such as diplomatic efforts or funding
6. Better allocation of resources (funding and personnel)
7. Better integration of all USG agencies involved (i.e., integration of civilian, military, police, and aid functions) on both the strategic (national) and the operational level
8. More rapid identification of issues for senior policy makers
9. A better monitor mechanism to control the implementation<sup>16</sup>

To facilitate this process and its intended improvements a set of related management tools were developed. This set of tools consists of an Executive Committee (ExComm), a political-military implementation plan, an interagency political-military plan rehearsal, an interagency after action review (AAR), and, last but not least, interagency training. These tools--as well as the PDD itself--are still in effect, despite the fact that this policy is of a former administration.<sup>17</sup>

To start with the first one of the tools, the ExComm provides unified planning guidance, is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the PDD-56 process, and monitors the interagency working group (IWG). The ExComm, consisting of the assistant secretaries of the involved departments, operates under the Deputies Committee.<sup>18</sup> After a crisis occurs the Deputies Committee takes the lead in terms of planning and managing a CCO and establishing an ExComm. As soon as an ExComm is established, it is responsible for the determination of valid tasks and responsibilities, early intervention and resolution of the crisis, synchronization of civilian and military planning timelines, timely identification of necessary resources, and satisfaction of personnel and funding requirements.<sup>19</sup>

As a second tool, the political-military plan is the result of the aforementioned political-military planning process that articulates critical elements of U.S. operations in CCOs. These elements, eleven in total, address the following: (1) situation assessment, (2) U.S. interests, (3)

mission statement, (4) objectives, (5) desired political-military end state, (6) concept of the operation, (7) lead agency responsibilities, (8) transition or exit strategy, (9) organizational concept, (10) preparatory tasks, and (11) functional element plans. The political-military plan intends to lay out a coordinated multidimensional strategy to achieve a successful mission.<sup>20</sup>

Thirdly, the interagency rehearsal, refines mission area plans to achieve unity of effort. The focus of the rehearsal is to identify problems and disconnects that could arise during execution. The PDD-56 provides the criteria to measure the plan during the rehearsal. These criteria are effectiveness, integration, and feasibility; a key element is synchronization. The rehearsal is part of the integrated planning.

Fourthly, the interagency AAR makes an assessment of the interagency planning efforts during and after the implementation phase of the political-military plan in order to learn lessons for future conduct of CCOs and to further improve the performance of the USG. The fifth and final tool, the interagency training, leads to the buildup of a group of governmental officials who have advanced knowledge of the interagency process and who have familiarity with the other agencies and their culture. The purpose of the interagency training is to improve the interagency readiness to respond to any complex emergency that should arise.

Since the issuing of PDD-56, the policy was applied extensively in CCOs like Eastern Slavonia (1995 to 1998), Bosnia (since 1995), the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict (since 1998), and the Kosovo contingency (1998 to 1999).<sup>21</sup> And although to many critics PDD-56 not has been applied as intended, it demonstrates potential and certain elements have been proven successful (the ExComm, the political-military plan, the interagency training and the rehearsals).<sup>22</sup> The armed forces, as major player in CCOs, already implemented most of PDD-56's contents one year earlier, in Joint Publication 3-08. This joint publication is the third document that will be analyzed.<sup>23</sup>



Why Did the U.S. Need Interagency  
Coordination--Joint Pub 3-08

What Is Joint Pub 3-08

Joint Pub, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, issued by the Chairman, JCS, contains joint doctrine for the activities and performance of the U.S. armed forces in interagency operations. It also describes the interagency environment, which consists of other GOs and NGOs and--more importantly--the national or political-strategic level institutions. Last but not least, it provides methodologies to optimize coordination between all actors involved in interagency operations on three levels: national or political-strategic level (NCA etc.), theater strategic level (CINC), and operational level (Commander Joint Task Force [CJTF], et cetera).<sup>24</sup>

Reasons for Interagency Coordination

As in NSA-47 and PDD-56, Joint Pub 3-08 sees the interagency process as the primary means to bring solutions in CCOs, both domestically and in foreign operations. It suggests that security challenges facing the U.S. are increasingly complex; the efforts and dedication of many organizations are required. Coordination is a prerequisite to make the performance of the total of all GOs and NGOs effective and efficient. The military commanders are increasingly expected to have a broader view on problems; interagency coordination demands commanders and joint planners to take into account the other instruments of national power.<sup>25</sup>

Accordingly, coordination between organizations involved will lead to more unity of effort in an operation. The interagency process, therefore, needs to aim at tuning the interests of various organizations despite their philosophical, ideological and operational differences. This is difficult because all organizations may not share the same view of endstate and objectives. The guidance provided by Joint-Pub 3-08 to build and maintain interagency cooperation is:

1. Define the problem in clear and unambiguous terms agreed to by all participants
2. Define the aims, objectives, and the resulting strategic focus

3. Establish a common frame of reference
4. Develop courses of actions or options
5. Capitalize on experience
6. Establish responsibility
7. Plan for the transition of key responsibilities, capabilities, and functions
8. Direct all means towards unity of effort<sup>26</sup>

Besides this instrumental approach, Joint Pub 3-08 also calls for a cooperative spirit and understanding of other agencies, departments, and organizations. That includes not only knowledge about capabilities (the hard side of the house), as well as awareness of other agency's values and moral standards, and an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect (the soft side of the house). Joint Pub 3-08 views functional interdependence (which means that one organization relies upon another to attain the objective) as the best "glue" between organizations.

#### Comparison Model between the U.S. and the Dutch Interagency Coordination

A comparison between the U.S. and the Dutch history of interagency coordination is necessary to determine the level of similarity between the two systems. That is an important step in the research, because if the reasons for having an interagency process (or the reasons a government ought to have such a system) are the same, then the instruments and mechanisms the USG chose might be worth an analysis in order to find out whether they are applicable to the Dutch governmental system and if so, How can that be done? In short: if there are enough similarities, it might be worth looking at the tools as a next step (see chapter 6).


Because the U.S. system for interagency coordination is already much more formal and institutionalized, the comparison will be made with the following input:

1. From the U.S. standpoint: the arguments that required an increased interagency coordination and the intended effects of implemented policy

2. From the Dutch standpoint: the shortfalls in the governmental system--more specifically the shortfalls in terms of interagency coordination-- that have been identified in the examined period of time

The process that led to the determination of similarities or differences is the following: First, to keep the analysis manageable the input was reduced to the nineteen major shortfalls on the Dutch side and the ten reasons as well as the six intended solutions for interagency coordination as described by NSA-47, PDD-56, and Joint Pub 3-08. This list was put together based on the review of the available literature on this topic.

Second, per Dutch shortfall the number of connections with U.S. reasons or intended solutions was limited to the four distinguished ones. This limitation had also to do with the manageability of the analysis; in theory there are hundreds of connections possible. A connection was established on recognizable matches which can be described as: (1) the same organization or issue (Who or what did it concern?) and (2) the same shortfall (What is the problem?). To give an example out of figure 2, Comparison U.S. and Dutch Interagency Coordination (see next page): The shortfall "Different agencies have different objectives, goals, and end state" deals with agencies as organization; the problem is the differentiation in objectives, goals, and end state. Based on organization or issue and shortfall a connection can be established with three U.S. reasons or intended solutions: (1) Complex issues require a strategic integration of all instruments of power, (2) the need to identify one strategic goal and, subsequently, the operational needs, and (3) unity of effort or unity of command (through the NSC-system).



**Figure 2: Comparison U.S. and Dutch Interagency Coordination**

Figure 2, Comparison U.S. and Dutch Interagency Coordination, shows the similarities and differences between the U.S. reasons and the Dutch shortfalls. Similarities are depicted with dotted lines; differences with a question mark. There are many similarities between Dutch shortfalls and U.S. reasons or U.S. intended solutions and only one difference. To start with the latter, there is only one Dutch shortfall that does not have a relation with a U.S. reason or a U.S. solution: The size of the government and the span of control of its managers tend to grow uncontrollably. The fact, however, that no connection could be made with a U.S. reason does not necessarily mean that the U.S. did not face a similar problem; it only was not identified in this research. On the other hand, this difference does not affect the relation of other U.S. reasons or U.S. solutions with similar Dutch shortfalls. Therefore, the conclusion can be that this difference can be ignored and left out.

Considering the many similarities, first of all the answer to the question whether there are enough similarities between the U.S. system and the Dutch system or not is yes. Remarkable is that some of the U.S. reasons or intended solutions correspond with more than one of the Dutch shortfalls than others. Obviously, some of these elements address more shortfalls on the Dutch side. This leads to the next step in the research. If a U.S. reason or intended solution is mentioned several times, it might be worth to further research in order to find out if the same concept is useable in the Dutch situation. This is particularly useful because the next step in the research will focus on certain elements from the U.S. system for interagency coordination to be revealed as (partial) solution for the interagency system in the Netherlands.

The U.S. concepts that were connected most often in the comparison were:

1. The national security system (for unity of effort and unity of command)
2. The need to identify one strategic goal
3. The political military planning process

4. The management tools related to the political-military planning process (related to several shortfalls)

The next chapter, chapter six, will try to answer the how question, What are the ways for the Dutch government to improve interagency coordination? To keep that chapter manageable the number of concepts that will be taken into consideration will be limited to the four previous mentioned concepts. These four U.S. intended solutions and reasons will form the basis for the development of concepts to improve the Dutch interagency coordination mechanisms.

Noteworthy is the fact that the ways to build and maintain interagency coordination, especially establishing responsibility, out of Joint Pub 3-08 was connected several times, too, but most of the ideas correspond to the four above-mentioned concepts (especially the "one strategic goal" and "the management tools related to the political-military planning process"). Therefore, these ideas will not be discussed separately in chapter six. Wherever applicable, the proper references to Joint Pub 3-08 will be made.

So far, the research dealt with the ideal world (the reasons for interagency coordination and the intentions of the provided solutions). The next chapter will deal with the unruly real world (how solutions were implemented in the USG and the lessons learned that followed upon the introduction of those ideas) in order to provide solutions for the Dutch situation that are as truthful as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process into the 21st Century", in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 179.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997*, August 1997; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Douglas T. Stuart, "Present at the legislation: The 1947 National Security Act," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 6-9.

<sup>4</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 5.

<sup>5</sup> Douglas T. Stuart, "Present at the legislation: The 1947 National Security Act," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 9-17.

<sup>6</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 21-22.

<sup>7</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, no. 69 (Winter 87-88): 81; quoted in LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 45.

<sup>8</sup> Douglas T. Stuart, "Present at the legislation: The 1947 National Security Act," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 15-21.

<sup>9</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process into the 21st Century," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 164.

<sup>10</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 35.

<sup>11</sup> National Security Council, *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1998), with a foreword by Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor.

<sup>12</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, (Baltimore: GPO, 1996), III-25.

<sup>13</sup> Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameter*, winter 1998, 39.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. President, *White Paper The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56, May 1997*, (Washington: GPO, 1997), 2-7.

<sup>15</sup> Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, winter 1998, 42.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. President, *White Paper The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56* (Washington: GPO, 1997), 3-4.

<sup>17</sup> Paul Marks (Political-Military Planner in the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 3 March 2001.

<sup>18</sup> The Deputy Committee consists of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy National Security Advisors, and augmentation from other departments if required).

<sup>19</sup> Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameter*, winter 1998, 44.

<sup>20</sup> National Security Council, *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1998), 10.

<sup>21</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process into the 21st Century," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 180.

<sup>22</sup> The way the USG has implemented the policy goes beyond the scope of this chapter; the lessons learned will be part of analysis in chapter six as source for the Dutch Government to improve interagency coordination.

<sup>23</sup> William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency cooperation – PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, spring 2000, 96.

<sup>24</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency coordination During Joint Operations* (Baltimore: GPO, 1996), i and x.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, I-2.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, I-11 – I-14.



## CHAPTER SIX

### WAYS TO CONDUCT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

#### Structure

The two previous chapters proved that there is a link between the historical reasons for the U.S. to formalize the interagency process and the historical shortfalls in the Dutch situation. With this link the why question has been answered. The final step in the research is answering the how question. This step will be conducted based on the following proposition: If both the U.S. and Dutch reasons for having an interagency process (or need to have such a system) are the same, then the instruments and mechanisms that the USG chose might be worth analyzing in order to find out whether they are applicable to the Dutch governmental system and if so, how they could be implemented. This approach fits into the aim of this chapter, which is to determine the ways and tools to make Dutch agencies work together more efficiently.

This chapter is structured as follows. First of all, the foundation of the answer to the how question is the outcome of the comparison that concluded chapter five. This comparison not only revealed the similarities between the Dutch and the U.S. interagency situation; it also served as a bridge to this chapter by identifying the instruments and mechanisms that are most likely to be used in the Netherlands.

Successively, each of these instruments and mechanisms, or tools, will be analyzed by first outlining (after being outlined initially in chapter five) what it is about and secondly to consider what that specific tool has meant to the process in the real world. So far, all ideas and concepts have been theoretical ideas; the experiences with the ideas and concepts after implementation have been excluded. That is why in this chapter the lessons learned are significant, because while assessing a certain tool, also a conclusion must be drawn how it impacted on the USG system. This evaluation is necessary to prevent the same mistakes from happening again if it would be implemented in the Dutch governmental system. Finally, after

being sufficiently analyzed, each of the proposed tools will be subjected to the FASA-test in order to draw conclusions as to what extent a certain tool can be implemented in the Netherlands and which of the shortfalls in the Dutch system potentially could be resolved. In short: the structure is based on the following questions:

1. What is the tool?
2. How does it contribute to enhanced interagency coordination?
3. What are the lessons learned?
4. Can the Netherlands use this tool?
5. Which of the shortfalls would it--potentially--resolve?

The tools that will be analyzed are the following: the NSC-system, the need to have unity of effort, the political-military implementation planning process, and the management tools related to this process.

Part of the aforementioned lessons learned will derive from literature; another part will be formed by the outcome of an interview with governmental officials that have to deal with interagency processes. After all, the real world is more capricious than the theory could have foreseen and therefore, unexpected dynamics might have influenced the original ideas. Appendix B delineates the questionnaire that formed the basis for the interview and the officials that participated. The outcome of the interview will be the--partial--input for the analysis of the tools that were chosen to be analyzed for applicability in the Netherlands. The lessons learned that are not covered in previous topics will conclude this chapter.

Finally, the FASA-test that will be used, will--for this research--be translated into the following questions in table 3:

Table 3 Specified FASA-test

F	Feasibility	Is the application of the tool feasible or need additional measures to be taken?
A	Acceptability	Is the application of the tool acceptable (according to the constitution, governmental regulations, law or common manners in the Dutch governmental system?)
S	Suitability	Will the proposed tools be suitable (will the tool provide a solution for the existing shortfalls?)
A	Adequacy	Will the proposed tools be adequate (will the tool provide an effective and efficient solution.)

### The National Security Council Structure

#### The Origins of the NSC

The NSC was not the first organization to deal with what is now called national security and interagency coordination. In 1919, Franklin Delano Roosevelt had already proposed to establish a Joint Plan-Making Body to address issues that were overlapping between the Departments of State, War and Navy. This proposal was never implemented and a lack of coordination could be noticed. For example, during the Washington Naval Limitations Conference the State Department negotiated about naval strengths without even consulting the Department of the Navy. In 1935 the Standing Liaison Committee was established, but due to a lack of trust between the departments and the absence of an independent staff, this committee was barely effective.<sup>1</sup>

Then, in 1947, the NSC was established. According to the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA-47), the role of the NSC was to coordinate political and military questions. More specifically the NSC was:

to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security . . .

(to execute) other functions . . . for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies . . .

to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security . . .

to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States . . .

to consider policies on matters of common interest (...) concerned with the national security . . .<sup>2</sup>

The Council was also to have an independent, supporting and coordinating staff, headed by a civilian presidential appointee--the National Security Adviser (NSA). This staff can be described as a:

secretariat . . . charged with preparing its agenda, providing data essential to its deliberations, and distributing its conclusions to the departments and agencies concerned for information and appropriate action.<sup>3</sup>

#### Functions of the NSC

Starting as strictly an advisory board and having no policy-making or supervisory functions, soon the NSC evolved into a policy-making organization. At present the NSC is the most powerful policy-making staff in Washington and the system--designed more than five decades ago--has not changed in essence although it is much larger in size than it was originally. Throughout the years the presidents increasingly used the NSC as an instrument to supervise competing departments, rather than to foster collegiality among the departments.<sup>4</sup>

According to LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, author of *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council*, the NSC has evolved eight major functions.<sup>5</sup> More importantly, to analyze these functions, he depicts them in an order of increasing controversy. This depiction will be helpful when the NSC--categorized by its functions--is subjected to the FASA-test in order to assess to what extent a NSC and the NSC Staff is applicable to the Dutch governmental system. The eight functions are:

1. Administration of policy

2. Coordination of policy
3. Integration of policy
4. Policy Supervision
5. Adjudication of policy
6. Crisis Management
7. Formulation of policy
8. Advocacy of policy

In the following section the advantages and disadvantages of each of the functions in the U.S. situation will be articulated.

The *administration of policy* function deals with the clerical support by the NSC Staff to the NSC. Although very important to make the NSC work, this function hardly affects the policy making process. This function is influential in only two aspects. The first aspect is concerned with control over the NSC agenda by the NSA, who heads the NSC Staff. The second aspect is note taking. Remarkable is the fact that after Watergate the White House is very reluctant of taping meetings, which increases the influence of the note taker in the entire process.<sup>6</sup>

The *coordination of policy* function--actually the function for which NSC came into being--is a rather passive activity involving preparing policies, concepts, and proposals before submitting them to the President or the NSC. In short, the coordination function is about managing the flow of information. Issues that require resolution will be identified in that process. The coordination function of the NSC Staff is widely accepted and has been successful in resolving countless issues during several administrations.<sup>7</sup> In the Clinton administration the coordination function led to a hierarchal organization of meetings of the Principals Committee (PC), the Deputies Committee (DC), and numerous interagency working groups (IWGs). Although the Bush administration reduced the size of NSC (and renamed the committees) and

focuses on (interagency) coordination rather than policymaking, the structure remained merely the same (see figure 3).




Figure 3. Interagency Processes and Organization. (Illustration from USACGSC, Course A-512 National Policy Formulation.)

Disadvantage of the coordination function can be that there is too much coordination (as, for instance, the Eisenhower administration was criticized for), which can lead to "only vapid consensus positions."<sup>8</sup> Another disadvantage can be an inherent delay of the process if too many agencies are included and the chances of having leaks if too many officials are involved.

The *integration of policy* function goes farther than the coordination function. It is an active participation in the process and it melds different views on a policy matter or different concepts into one--sometimes very concise--document for the President and the NSC to read. To be in a position to draft this brief document on which a decision will be made provides an official

with a tremendous amount of power. At the same time it requires a critically responsible person to be able to deal with this high responsibility.<sup>9</sup>

The *policy supervision* function deals with the mechanism to oversee the execution and implementation of the interagency policy that was agreed upon. The NSC is particularly suited for this function, because none of the other governmental institutions is permitted to intervene in each other's internal affairs. To a lesser extent, agencies might not be able to supervise the implementation of policy in their own department or agency either.<sup>10</sup>

There are two main dangers involved in this function. On the one hand the power of the NSC can be insufficient to carry out this function. Agencies can obstruct, alter, delay, et cetera--purposely or accidentally--the policy that has to be implemented. This is inherent to bureaucracies and is a bureau-political gamism that always comes into play.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the NSC must not be tempted to execute an operational role ("if they do not do it, we do it ourselves"). This can ultimately lead to a situation as seen in the Iran Contra Affair in which LTC Oliver North confused supervision on implementation with the implementation itself.

The *adjudication of policy* function is closely related to the supervision role. Whereas supervision is more passive, adjudication deals with an active guidance how to implement policy. Presidential decisions will leave room for many interpretations dependent on the agency or even the individual. It is therefore a NSC Staff task to clarify the President's intent of a policy document and to resolve disputes on the implementation.

Sometimes the adjudication of a decision is mandated to an implementing monitoring committee in the decision document itself; sometimes the NSC has to appoint such a committee. The same disadvantages apply with this function as with the supervision function: bureau-political games and a struggle for (bureaucratic) power--within and without--the NSC Staff. Adjudication, too, goes along with a great sense of responsibility of the particular staff member.<sup>12</sup>

The function of *crisis management* addresses the need for an institution that can deal with crises that exceed the capabilities and responsibilities of one agency. In a crisis there is usually not much time for deliberations due to the character of a crisis.<sup>13</sup> The problem lays in the perception of a crisis. To many critics that is the reason why the NSC is too often and too actively involved in (crisis) management; in many of those cases there is no real crisis.

Agreement can be achieved on one issue: a crisis requires strong leadership and a small professional, well-trained and well-informed (as possible) staff to attack the problem. That is the reason why on so many occasions the President, the NSC and the NSC Staff were able to come up with the timeliest and best solution possible under the circumstances. The NSC is the only USG institution that is suited for that function.

Two other problems arise. The first one is that, after the NSC has resolved the immediate threat of a crisis, the bureaucratic power remains in the NSC Staff on a more permanent basis and tends not to shift back to the agencies and departments. This, of course, has to be avoided. The other problem concerns the preparation for and the nature of a crisis. Crisis planning in a situation of no crises equals contingency planning for applying all instruments of power to solve a yet unknown but sudden and unexpected situation. However, it is obvious that it is very hard to anticipate and prepare for the "right" crisis.<sup>14</sup>

The *formulation of policy* function is a controversial one. During its existence the NSC Staff has formulated policy at the expense of the State Department and the Department of Defense. This leads to competition between agencies, usually a competition in which one player loses what the other wins (zero-sum game). This can be a very counterproductive way to make policy. The earlier mentioned bureau-political obstruction will occur maximally when (civil servants in) agencies and departments realize that they have been left out. This can affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the government negatively.



The formulation function deals basically with the balance between a secretarial system in which the departments have the lead--in the case of national security the primary secretary would be the Secretary of State--and presidential system.<sup>15</sup> In a presidential system the President has the lead role (presidential decision making). It depends on the President but also on the personalities and capabilities of the other members of the NSC which system prevails. Commonly the presidential system prevails. This equals a more powerful role of the NSC Staff at, again, the expense of the Departments of State and Defense.<sup>16</sup>

The *advocacy of policy* function refers to the formulated policy. Once the President has formulated his policy or is in the process of formulating policy, it has to be argued with numerous groups within and outside the government. Especially if this policy is formulated in an area of one of the departments the chances are high that it has to face bureau-political resistance. The advocacy function is a difficult one for the NSC Staff because it articulates the dual role of the staff. On one hand the NSC Staff has to present coordinated departmental views on certain issues. On the other hand--as an advisory body to the President--the NSC Staff has to present its own position.

There are basically three ways for the NSC to advocate policies. First, the NCS Staff participates in interagency meetings on different levels (PCs, DCs, and IWGs). In these meetings NSC Staff-members can actively recommend certain options. Secondly, the NCS Staff presents positions in a summary memorandum. Nearly every national security-related document submitted to the President comes from the NSC Staff. Thirdly, the NSC Staff can submit its position to the National Security Advisor (NSA). The NSA can address this issue to the President in one of the daily meetings or, more formally, in an official NSC-meeting.<sup>17</sup>

Applicability of a NSC-Structure in the.  
Dutch Governmental System

Having described the impact of the eight functions that cover the position and role of the NSC, now it is the question to what extent this structure can be implemented in the Dutch system. As stated before, the functions have been described by increasing controversy in the USG and the assumption can be made that the same applies in the Dutch Government if these functions would be in effect in the Netherlands. A summary of the outcome of this FASA-test will precede the explanation and is depicted in table 4. The following sections will delineate and explain the conclusions.

Table 4: The FASA-test applied to the functions of the NSC

	Feasibility	Acceptability	Suitability	Adequacy
Administration	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, but probably not enough
Coordination	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, but probably not enough
Integration	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supervision	Perhaps	Perhaps	Yes	Yes
Adjudication	Probably not	Probably not	Probably not	Yes
Crisis Management	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Formulation	Perhaps	No	No	No
Advocacy	Perhaps	No	No	No

The Feasibility and Acceptability of the Functions

Functions that almost certainly would be feasible, but that would not be acceptable to be executed by a separate NSC kind of organization--superposed over the departments--are the *formulation and advocacy of policy*. There is no Minister, nor the Prime Minister that has the sole executive power to superpose interagency-related policies to the other departments. An equal

power in an organization similar to the NSC--under the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister--would not be acceptable and therefore is not applicable.

*Crisis Management* is a function that shows a shortfall in the current Dutch system. Constitutionally there are no objections against a body that would execute interagency crisis management tasks. For instance, for domestic crises on a national scale (a crisis that exceeds the boundaries of one province, that exceeds the capabilities on provincial or local level, or that concerns more than one department) there is the National Coordination Center (NCC) in the Ministry of the Interior. It therefore could be an option to establish a similar body for international affairs--a Coordination Center for International Affairs (CCIA)--that could solve, potentially, many of the shortfalls in the current system, like the absence of communications in case of an international crisis in which the Netherlands is involved (such as the fall of Srebrenica). Often in a crisis the situation is confusing, but the time to react limited. Solid and clear lines of communication (rather than the more informal way the Dutch officials tend to communicate) are the prerequisite to manage effectively a crisis.

The opposite of crisis management is the deliberate planning of policy. The same CCIA could act as a body to *administer, coordinate and integrate* policy that requires the involvement of more than one department. This would also be constitutional and would address some of the identified shortfalls in the Dutch government, such as the requirement to have a closer coordination between the ministries. A CCIA could monitor the processes that occur in different agencies and could monitor the interagency coordination between these agencies, especially because earlier the conclusion was that IWGs sometimes do not exist in cases where they could have been expected.

More difficult is the implementation of the *supervision* function. The departments in the Dutch government have great responsibility and independence in the execution of policy. The current system of checks and balances between the executive branch (the cabinet and the

ministries) and the legislative branch (the Parliament) would be challenged if a supervisory board came into being. This function is without doubt needed in a governmental system, but whether the current system is sufficient or not, or whether a CCIA should play a role in it, should be made subject of a detailed study.

The function of *adjudication* is more an extension of the formulation or advocacy function, which would make it unlikely that a NSC kind of organization could take over this function from the departments. In case of an interagency policy there will always be a lead ministry that will take care of the adjudication of policy.

#### Suitability of the Functions

The outcome of the suitability of the functions in the Dutch system is almost similar as the feasibility and acceptability criteria except for the *supervision* function. A NSC kind of organization--the earlier introduced CCIA--would be better suited to supervise interagency policy. A related aspect that has to be realized, though, is that such an organization would come into being at the expense of the influence of the ministries involved. That requires a change in the current relations between the departments.

#### Adequacy of the Functions

So far, the reasoning has been bottom-up (i.e., in an increasing form of controversy). For the criterion of adequacy the reasoning is preferably top-down, because the most controversial functions of the U.S. NSC-structure address the interagency shortfalls the most. The more centralized policy formulation and advocacy is, the fewer problems in terms of interagency might be expected. This is, however, true to a certain extent. It is very likely that in the Dutch governmental culture, bureau-politics would interfere and obstruct severely a too centralized policymaking apparatus and process. It therefore would achieve the opposite result. This applies

without doubt to the function of policy *formulation* and the *advocacy* of policy, in which the departments have--as stated before--a great responsibility and independence.

With regard to the *supervision, adjudication* of policy as well as the execution of *crisis management*, an NSC structure would be very adequate as a solution for the identified shortfalls. A very adequate way to conduct crisis management would be, for instance, the availability of direct lines, which allow an open flow of information and a quick identification and clarification of tasks and responsibilities and would address existing problems. It would make the (usually slow) government more agile in situations (for example crises) where agility is required. Also, the earlier mentioned "watchdog" function--checking and monitoring whether a policy is sufficiently interagency--could be very effective to guard the interagency process.

At the same time, this could not be created with only the execution of the *administration, coordination, and integration* function. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the execution of these functions by an interagency structure would be insufficient to solve the problems.

#### Position of a CCIA

Earlier the idea arose to establish a Dutch NSC-type of organization--a CCIA--based on the fact that for domestic affairs the Netherlands already has a coordination center to deal with national--domestic--crises: the NCC. If a CCIA should have to be established then it could be integrated into one at two positions in the Dutch government: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of General Affairs (the Prime Minister's ministry). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be the most logical position because this ministry is already the lead ministry for (the political aspects) of international affairs that require the involvement of more than one department. Secondly, the position of the CCIA would be equal to the position of the NCC in the Ministry of the Interior (for national crises). On the other hand, there are two arguments for a CCIA in the Ministry of General Affairs. First reason is the impartiality of this ministry between the other ministries involved in international affairs. The second reason is that the Prime

Minister--much more than before--acts as the Head of Government in a variety of international fora like the summits of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the cost of the influence and power of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Yet, the positioning of a CCIA would be most likely in the ministry of Foreign Affairs. A CCIA could be implemented in the Dutch government with the following functions:

*administration, coordination, and integration. Supervision* may be possible but additional research is necessary to come up with a firm conclusion on that function. The *adjudication* function would be very unlikely to be carried out by a CCIA due to the fact that in interagency policy usually is adjudicated by the lead ministry. On the other hand, the CCIA would be the right institution to execute *crisis management* on the national level. The *formulation and advocacy* of policy, however, would stay within the departments and agencies.

#### The Need for Unity of Effort

##### The USG Notion on Unity of Effort

Interagency coordination aims at a synchronization of interagency operations. A broad range of departments have to work together and they all bring their own culture, skills, expertise, goals, et cetera. Crucial in this process of cooperation is unity of effort.<sup>18</sup> All means involved shall be directed towards the same goals and must support instead of oppose each other.

The starting point for unity of effort is a strategic direction on the national level. For the U.S. the strategic direction can primarily be found in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS expresses the U.S. national interest, the use of all instruments of power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic [DIME]) to promote these interests. Each of the USG agencies can derive from the NSS its own strategy, for instance for the Armed Forces there is a National Military Strategy (NMS).

Once the national strategy is known, the goal for U.S. policy (the desired endstate) for a certain region, issue, or crisis can be established. Also, the aims, intents and objectives can be

identified to achieve that goal. All these objectives, aims, and intents have to be nested to achieve unity of effort. Nesting has been defined as the top-to-bottom rationale that ties interests, purposes, objectives, and end state.<sup>19</sup> This nested concept is a result of a well-performed interagency analysis of the situation and forms the basis for an interagency policy. With the nested concept--and more particularly with achievable and measurable objectives in this concept--it is clear for each of the involved departments and agencies what their role and responsibility is in the joined endeavor. Unity of effort then can be the desired result.

Having one strategic goal and a clear strategic direction--and subsequently unity of effort--is also important because often there is not one decisive authority and it is not possible for an agency to force other agencies to do something.<sup>20</sup> If it is clear to agencies what their role is, then there is less necessity for a central authority to direct them.<sup>21</sup> The problem of having or establishing authority in a multi-agency environment will be discussed later in this thesis.

Another reason why it is important to have one strategic goal and unity of effort is the fact that interagency planning and crisis management are complex even under the best of circumstances. A nested concept of goals and objectives can reduce and simplify the complexity; it can make the situation manageable. Clear intents provide flexibility. An agency then knows why it has to do what, instead of the--much more inflexible--how to do what. With a clear intent an agency can anticipate on situations that were unforeseen during the planning phase of an operation.

Two additional remarks concern unity of effort. The first is that a clear distinction needs to be made between short-term and long-term objectives. Some of the agencies will aim at short-term objectives. An example is the deployment of the Armed Forces for a crisis response mission. In the same situation some other agencies aim at the achievement of long-term objectives. An example is USAID. It is obvious that this can create tension.<sup>22</sup> Identification of the (differences

between) short-term and long-term objectives and how they can mutually support each other can reduce this tension.

The second additional remark is that the plan that reflects the tasks for each of the participating agencies needs to include a time frame within which the objectives have to be achieved. Based on the aforementioned nested concept of tasks and purposes, an accompanying time frame can enable the assessment of the effectiveness of a policy or the measuring of the degree of success of an operation. It can also be used to adjust and synchronize the operation during the execution phase. Herewith, unwanted side effects such as mission creep or an excessively long engagement in an operation can be avoided or can be identified and timely countermeasures can be taken.

The PDD-56 and the Joint Pub 3-08, as well as other documents, view unity of effort as the core prerequisite for a correct synchronization of interagency operations and also the key to success of a policy (for deliberate planning) or mission (for crisis management).<sup>23</sup> The primary coordination to carry out a multi-agency assessment of the situation and to synchronize the efforts of all agencies involved takes place at the national-strategic level. That is why interagency coordination on the national-strategic level is crucial for a government to be effective in international affairs and to optimally address the national interests.

#### How to Apply Unity of Effort in the Dutch Government

The U.S. concept of unity of effort will be subjected to the FASA-test in order to determine whether it can be applied in the Netherlands. In the U.S. approach this concept includes several elements, such as:

1. A National Security Strategy, which expresses national interests, employing all the DIME instruments of power.
2. One overarching political goal (the desired endstate).



3. Nesting of all subsequent and underlying aims, intents and objectives, to make them supported or supportive. This creates one strategic direction.

4. Objectives and tasks that are achievable and measurable.

5. Intent instead of just tasks is important to create the necessary flexibility in the interagency organization, especially because there is no decisive authority to direct the variety of agencies.

6. The identification of separate objectives and tasks for the short term and the long term that do not conflict.

7. A timetable to keep track of the progress

All of these elements are mechanisms to make the interagency process work. Some of them have been addressed in Dutch regulations to a certain extent but not as comprehensively as they are presented here.

Some elements have not been addressed thoroughly enough. A National Security Strategy in which the specific Dutch interests are articulated does not exist to an extent that it provides a 'lead thought' for international affairs. (What does the Netherlands want to achieve and for what interest will it be done?) Occasionally, if required by the situation (for example in the decision-making process whether Dutch troops should participate in a mission), there is a discussion about the national interests that are at stake. A thorough analysis and continual adjustment of the Dutch policy regarding national interest is a topic that hardly gets any attention. Many complaints, however, on the effectiveness in foreign affairs are related to a poor outcome in terms of serving Dutch interests. To justify these comments, however, clear national interests have to be formulated as well as a national strategy in the first place.

The comprehensive (NSS, NMS) model--as presented in the previous paragraph--does not exist in the Netherlands, although there is no reason why it could not be usable. Each of the elements is feasible, it is acceptable, and it would address the complexity of the interagency

processes adequately. In terms of suitability it might require an additional institution (like the earlier introduced CCIA) to concentrate fully on the process, the right application of all elements as well as an adequate use of the nested concept model. With the introduction and use of this model many known shortfalls that deal with focusing a multi-agency organization like the fact that often the different agencies have different objectives, goals, and endstates, could be resolved or unfavorable situations could be prevented from occurring. Also, the Netherlands would be able to focus and synchronize all instruments of power towards a desired endstate, defined after having described a national security strategy.

### The Political-Military Implementation Planning Process

#### The USG Use of the Political-Military Implementation Planning Process

The political-military plan forms the backbone of the measures that were issued by PDD-56. The political-military plan rationalizes all civilian and military contributions in one directive.<sup>24</sup> The directive reflects the policy and the associated operation plans to resolve a crisis or to address a certain national security issue in a way that missions and tasks can be allocated to the right institutions. The plan is based on a comprehensive assessment of the situation that allows for a widely supported framework of ends, ways, and means (nested concept). It also provides coordinating measures and identifies the responsibilities and priorities for each of the participating agencies. Finally, it establishes the accountability for each of the agencies.

The political-military plan consists of the following elements:<sup>25</sup>

1. A situation assessment
2. U.S. interests
3. A mission statement
4. Objectives
5. A desired political-military end state

6. A concept of the operation
7. Lead agency responsibilities
8. A transition or exit strategy
9. An organizational concept
10. Preparatory tasks
11. A functional element plan

The planning process that culminates in the political-military plan is, in fact, even more important than the plan itself. If executed properly the process can be utilized to identify gaps and redundancies in policies and measures to be taken, and secondly, to accelerate the planning in agencies that are less used to be involved in this kind of planning. It can also be used to identify gaps and redundancies in the available resources as well as legal disconnects, and most importantly, the process can be used to develop an overarching and effective strategy as quickly as possible which forms the lead thought for the development of operational plans.

The planning process facilitates the integration and coordination of civilian and military efforts to respond to complex emergencies.<sup>26</sup> In the political-military plan many agencies are brought together. These agencies conduct a wide variety of activities such as diplomacy, military security, humanitarian assistance, political transition, public security, intelligence collection and analysis, human rights, social reconciliation and economic restoration.<sup>27</sup>

In practice, however, it is quite difficult to conduct a proper political-military planning process. According to the interview with USG officials one of the reasons for the difficulty is that many officials have the expertise only in a certain area and do not have the background in other areas/functions that would lead them to see the utility of this planning process. Also--as one points out--officials do not want to open their "bailiwick" to others and they do not want to tie themselves down to a multi-agency plan.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the political-military planning process is adversarial in nature, although that does not necessarily mean that it is an inherent defect of the

process. Conflicts can serve to highlight key issues and potential pitfalls before the operation starts and thus allow officials to come to terms with the plan, which is preferable to sorting out roles once the actors are in the field of operations.<sup>29</sup>

To some governmental officials there are mainly two ways to improve the participation in the planning-process: (1) to find a governmental official with enough authority (like the Vice-President or a Secretary) who can enforce this mechanism to work or (2) else through legislation: there should be no Congressional support for a plan that has not been designed according to the standards and contents of a political-military planning process.<sup>30</sup> Although it is hard for officials to influence the Congress, the idea behind the latter remark is a constructive one. It is more likely to get approval for new strategies and plans if conducted through a political-military planning process. The Congress tends to support policies that are worked more thoroughly and that are so solid that hardly any question can be raised.

Overall USG officials tend to have positive observations on their experience with the political-military plan. Over the last three years 15 political-military plans have been established, of which several are used. The best example is the political-military plan for Kosovo that--although amended, evolved and altered over time--is in its core still in effect.<sup>31</sup>

To conclude the lessons learned on working with the political-military planning process, the most important characteristic in this concept is flexibility. A good political-military plan retains flexibility to evolve, and a good interagency process allows for the plan to be modified if the policy or the circumstances change (see the above mentioned political-military plan for Kosovo). The political-military plan is a culture and a process more than a product. One cannot have a hierarchical or bureaucratic structure with communication only at the top. Communication must flow up, down and sideways, enabling the necessary flexibility in the planning process, as well as flexibility during the execution phase of a plan.<sup>32</sup>

## The Applicability of the Political-Military Plan in the Dutch Government

Considering the FASA-test, the political-military plan could be implemented in the Netherlands but it would not be likely to be successful without additional regulations. In the first place, the political-military plan is *suitable*, because many existing problems would be resolved, like the requirement to tune the policies of the involved agencies in a better manner; it would address the problem of ministries not coordinating enough. The political-military plan is also *adequate* because it connects a complexity of actors and their activities reduce to a common denominator, based on effectiveness and efficiency. With the political-military plan it would be easy to accelerate planning, to facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms, to rapidly identify issues for policy makers, and to ensure quick implementation of decisions. The political-military plan as such is *acceptable* in terms of existing regulations and laws.

The only problem might be the *feasibility*, because the agencies in the Netherlands are considerably independent. In the USG, officials recommend a law to force agencies to work together or recommend the Congress not to agree on a plan if it is not designed according to the political-military plan features; in the Dutch situation these recommendations might be even more necessary. The political-military plan is therefore feasible, if additional regulations make departments work together. A second requirement would be an institution that can monitor ministers and ministries executing the political-military planning process correctly and that can report to the Parliament. The Parliament then can hold the involved officials and governmental organizations accountable for their negligence towards the process. The CCIA could fulfill this task. Without these additional regulations and this control element it is unlikely that the political-military plan would be effective. Finally, one aspect cannot be forgotten: the experience of USG officials with the political-military planning process over the past few years. This experience would be very helpful for a smooth implementation of the planning process in the Dutch government.

Management Tools Related to the  
Political-Military Planning Process

The Use of the Management Tools in the U.S.

If the political-military plan is considered as the backbone of interagency coordination, then the related management tools can be viewed as supporting efforts. The PDD-56 mentions several management tools to enable a proper conduct of the planning and execution of the plan. The most significant are the establishment of:

1. The ExComm to provide unified planning guidance and to be responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the political-military planning process.
2. The political-military plan rehearsal to refine mission area plans, to identify problems and disconnects that could arise during execution in order to achieve unity of effort.
3. The interagency AAR to evaluate the planning and execution of the political-military plan.
4. The interagency training to form a group of governmental officials that are trained to work in an interagency environment.

These management tools have been outlined more in detail in chapter five.

It is widely accepted that the management tools could potentially contribute to the efficient execution of the political-military planning process.<sup>33</sup> All these elements (the ExComm, joint training, rehearsals, and the AAR) have proven to contribute to the success of an operation or to a successful implementation of a policy. However, it is too early to come up with detailed conclusions on the effectiveness of these tools, because they have hardly been implemented so far which is exactly the problem.

Whereas officials do not see or do not want to see the utility of the political-military plan, the implementation of the supporting tools faces even more obstruction. That is what A.B. Technologies--a consulting firm--found out after conducting an effectiveness-study in 1999, two years after the issue of PDD-56.<sup>34</sup> To give an example: Considering the interagency training even

the head of the National Defense University (NDU) is not directly engaged in the training effort, although this is one of the institutions that have been directly tasked by PDD-56 to develop and conduct a multi-agency training program. The other tools do only slightly better but the overall application of these tools can be assessed as poor. A. B. Technologies also viewed lack of leadership by the NSC in the implementation of the planning process and its supporting management tools as the main reasons for this noncompliance. Finally, the agencies often do not even know their role in the planning process or, even worse, some of the agencies ignore the planning process and the provided tools completely.

The interviewed USG officials admit that there are still many shortfalls in the system, but they point out that it usually requires a long-term commitment to change governmental processes. It simply takes time for the culture of interagency planning to be accepted and inculcated into the broader governmental community. Over the past few years, steady improvements could be noticed regarding interagency planning. Moreover, the more the agencies practice the process, the more comfortable they will become with it and the better the product will be. Hence, the interviewees perceive the training and the practice of interagency coordination as essential.<sup>35</sup>

As for the political-military plan, there are two ways to improve this situation: through additional legislation or through appointing a governmental official at a level of rank that makes things happen in the USG. This has already been discussed in the previous section on the political-military planning process itself.

#### The Applicability of the Management Tools in the Dutch Situation

For the use of the management tools in the Netherlands applies the same--in terms of the FASA-test--as the political-military plan itself. That means that the tools would be *suitable*, because many existing problems could be addressed, for example, the unfavorable situation that the application of policy, standards, and criteria differ per ministry or the lack of mandate for a

lead agency in a certain situation. The tools would also provide an *adequate* solution because it helps officials to deal with complex situations more effectively, efficiently, and timely. The tools enable the correct execution of the political-military plan and are therefore also *adequate*. None of the tools would be unacceptable in the Dutch system or according to the Dutch laws. They are therefore *acceptable*.

Again, similar to the political-military plan, the problems lay within the *feasibility*. Because of the highly independent position of the departments in the Netherlands, there can be even more problems and resistance expected in the execution of policy. Most likely, in the Netherlands the need for additional legislation or the appointment of a high-ranking government official is required to make this process happen or to force this process into happening. Even more important, though, is to bear in mind the observations and lessons learned by the USG officials who have worked with the management tools and whose experience would be invaluable if the Dutch government decides to implement these concepts.



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<sup>1</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 7.

<sup>2</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process into the 21st Century," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 166.

<sup>3</sup> Ferdinand Eberstadt, "Post War Organization for National Security," in *The Development of Political Military Consultation in the United States*, eds. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company), 1988, 75; quoted in LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 11.

<sup>4</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 2.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 27-63.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 29-32.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 33-36.

<sup>8</sup> Stanley L. Falk, "The NSC Under Truman and Acheson," in *The Development of Political Military Consultation in the United States*, eds. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company), 1988, 75; quoted in LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 34.

<sup>9</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 36-38.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 38-42.

<sup>11</sup> Bureau-political gamisms refer to Graham Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model III. This model considers internal politics and organizational behavior as a matter of perceptions, interests, stakes, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of principal players, from which outcomes emerge. Leaders of these organizations cannot operate autonomously. Organizational outputs result from bureaucratic bargaining and the pulling and hauling of various players that define the give and take of politics. Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (New York: David McKay, 1971), 322-384; quoted in "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," *Parameters, USAWC Quarterly*, winter 1998, 103.

<sup>12</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 42-44.

<sup>13</sup> The definition of a crisis as a situation that comes as a surprise to the decision makers, that requires a rapid response, and that appears to threaten (vital) interests of the country. Charles F. Hermann, "International Crises as a Situation Variable" in James N. Rosenau, ed. *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 414; quoted in LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 45.

<sup>14</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 44-49.

<sup>15</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, no. 69 (Winter 87-88): 81 - 82; quoted in LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 50.

<sup>16</sup> LTC Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, function and the NSC Staff: An officer's guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1989), 49-57.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 57-59.

<sup>18</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Washington: Documents Division, 1996), I-1.

<sup>19</sup> National Security Council, *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1998), B-13.

<sup>20</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process into the 21st Century," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 2000), 184.

<sup>21</sup> In the military this notion is commonly known as command relationship. Mission command and restrictive control form the two extremes in this field. Doctrinally, mission command can be described as the form of command that proceeds from decentralization of authority for the execution of military operations, whereby the indivisibility of responsibility remains undiminished. Mission command is based on the principles of decentralization, unity of command, mutual trust, mutual understanding, and timely and effective decision-making. Restrictive control reflects the opposite of this idea.

<sup>22</sup> Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for the Army* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 1997), 9.

<sup>23</sup> MAJ D. M. Last and Don Vought, *Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations – A Conference Report* (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1994), 17.

<sup>24</sup> Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters, USAWC Quarterly*, winter 1998, 44.

<sup>25</sup> National Security Council, *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1998), 10.

<sup>26</sup> Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," *Parameters, USAWC Quarterly*, Winter 1998, 43.

<sup>27</sup> National Security Council, *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1998), 3.

<sup>28</sup> Paul Marks (Political-Military Planner in the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 3 March 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Dennis Skocz (Director, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State) and James McNaught (Action Officer, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2001.

<sup>30</sup> Paul Marks (Political-Military Planner in the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 3 March 2001.

<sup>31</sup> Dennis Skocz (Director, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State) and James McNaught (Action Officer, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2001.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation – PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 2000, 95.

<sup>34</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "Study hits White House on peacekeeping missions," *The Washington Times*, 6 December 1999, A1.

<sup>35</sup> Dennis Skocz (Director, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State) and James McNaught (Action Officer, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2001.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

In recent years the Netherlands has increasingly been involved in international affairs, especially the Armed Forces that in the 1990s adopted a much more expeditionary role than in the previous decades (before the Inner German wall crumbled). Many of these operations are very complex and require the involvement of many departments. All these departments fulfill their tasks and missions, but there is a lack of unified approach on the national level. This leads to a situation of a considerably fragmented governmental performance in these affairs.

The obvious results are, first of all, less effectively and efficiently conducted operations. Secondly, problems emerge on the operational and tactical level that could have been overcome on the national or strategic level. Third, as a result, the Netherlands unwittingly enjoys a limited role in the international arena. As a small nation the Netherlands should synchronize the instruments of power in order to serve the national interests. For instance, there are many complaints in Parliament about the Netherlands not being involved in the Contact Group for former Yugoslavia on which the policy issues concerning the Balkans are discussed. At the same time, the Netherlands is one of the major contributors--in terms of money and troops--to this area and the Netherlands also accommodates a significant number of displaced persons from that area. These complaints are definitely justified.

The proposition of this research has been that properly conducted interagency coordination at the national level could address many of these coordination problems. Interagency coordination has received attention within the Netherlands; an example is the recent white paper of the Ministry of Defense in which this concept was addressed. Also, numerous other papers, articles, and studies have appeared that deal with interagency coordination. This research took a different approach: it was based on a comparative analysis between two governmental systems,

the USG and the Dutch government. This approach gave another perspective on interagency coordination and it provided new insights on the question of how to improve interagency coordination.

This chapter will successively discuss conclusions, recommendations, and topics for further research. It also serves as a summary. The conclusions will be outlined as answers to the research questions. First the tertiary question will be answered followed by the answers to the secondary research questions; the answer to the primary question will conclude this chapter.

### Summary and Conclusions

#### Current Shortfalls in the Dutch Government Regarding Interagency Coordination

The first question to be answered is, What are the current shortfalls regarding interagency coordination in the Dutch government? This question is relevant for several reasons: (1) it identifies and articulates the existing problem; (2) it is (the Dutch) stepping stone as input for the comparison between the situation in the U.S. and the Dutch situation; (3) it provides the necessary background to critically assess the outcome of the (rest of the) research; and (4) it also, as a side effect, leads--in conjunction with Appendix A (Government in the Netherlands)--to a better understanding of the Dutch governmental system.

The answer to this question is based on three decades (1972 to 1993) of research by parliamentary committees to improve the performance of the government. Many of the results of these studies have been acknowledged by research on another subject, but with related aspects, in 2000. The first finding is that the common denominator throughout the analyzed period seems to be that interagency coordination is an ongoing problem for governmental organizations, because governmental organizations are complex and the number of tasks huge. Also, issues are usually related to other issues that are the responsibility of different agencies. Yet, (interagency)

coordination is required to issue consistent policies and to be able to tune the wide range of-- closely related--activities.

Slowly, throughout the analyzed period, slowly the focus has shifted from interagency coordination to other fields of governing. All committees agree that there is still much to improve regarding interagency coordination. A remarkable fact is that several committees suggested conclusions and recommendations, but the implementation of all these recommendations and advice has been very limited. The most recent (2000) report reveals new shortfalls and emphasizes some of the old problems regarding interagency cooperation.

Nineteen major shortfalls are listed below, categorized as organizational, policy, and institutional-cultural (although some of the shortfalls could arguably be grouped in another category):

#### Organizational

1. IWGs do not always exist institutionally where they might have been expected.
2. Shortfalls exist in the information exchange between the Netherlands and other nations in case of an (international) emergency.
3. The size of governmental organizations and the span of control of its managers tend to grow uncontrollably, which increases the need for interagency coordination as a second order effect.
4. A closer coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense is required.
5. A lack of training of the governmental officials can be observed, which affects-- among other things--the interagency coordination.
6. The monitoring of the implementation of (interagency) policy is insufficient.
7. Coordinating officials suffer from a lack of authority in an IWG.

### Policy

8. The Netherlands has not been able to participate in the international political decision-making process because there is a lack of a focused approach by the government--and therefore the governmental agencies--on an objective that could be achieved.

9. A need has been identified to tune policies made by several ministries in a better manner.

10. IWGs do not coordinate sufficiently enough.

11. Assessments are made separately in cases that the (complex) situation requires an integral approach.

12. On some occasions, the way policies, standards, and criteria are applied differ per ministry.

13. Clear mandates and a clear set of rules for the IWGs do not always exist (or regulations for the observance of those rules) for those governmental officials that are involved in the interagency coordination.

14. Different agencies have different objectives in a certain situation.

### Institutional-Cultural

15. Difficult decisions are not always made by the entire IWG or Board, the members instead let the specialists solve the (complex) problem. This can lead to problems considering responsibility.

16. Departments are reluctant to use other departments (proven) standards and policy.

17. The exchange of information occurs informally.

18. Occasionally rivalry exists to an extent that it could be counterproductive for the overall performance of the government.

19. Sometimes IWGs are used for bureau-political games.

It was also possible to identify a trend for solutions. These solutions were proposed in almost all of the reports and are therefore noteworthy. It is remarkable that the committee viewed these solutions as a way to solve the coordination problem, but an analysis on the effectiveness of these solutions could not be found. The trends for solutions are:

1. Increase flexibility within the government.
2. Enhance job mobility of governmental personnel.
3. Train (the management skills of) governmental personnel. Continually, governmental managers need to further improve their knowledge and experience through cross training and a more flexible career path.
4. Reduce the size of the government, the number of IWGs, the span of control of governmental officials, et cetera.

Finally, throughout the last three decades there is an increased awareness that a reorganization of the ministries or agencies may be the easiest but not the most sufficient answer to coordination problems. The past shows that after radical reorganization often the same problem still existed. In short, a successful reorganization is easier said than done.

#### Reasons for Interagency Coordination in the U.S.

The second question to be answered was, What were the reasons for creating mechanisms for interagency coordination in the U.S.? This question is relevant for the following reasons: (1) it is the stepping-stone as input for the comparison between the situation in the U.S. and the Dutch situation, (2) it outlines the background of the USG in order to provide to a better understanding of that system, and (3) it reveals the first concepts, tools, and models that could be used to improve the Dutch interagency coordination. These ideas will be further developed in the answer to the next questions and will eventually form the most concrete and usable outcome of this research.



The answer to the question is based on the analysis of three key U.S. documents on interagency: (1) the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA-47), (2) the Presidential Decision Directive number 56 of 1997 (PDD-56), *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, and (3) the Joint Publication 3-08 *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* of 1996. The results of this analysis can be categorized as reasons for interagency coordination and intended solutions for interagency coordination. Intended solutions means solutions that can be found in the literature, including the intended effects. It describes the ideal world (without the dynamics of the real world). The main reasons and intended solutions for interagency coordination were:

#### Reasons for Interagency Coordination

1. The need for coherent, coordinated, integrated, and effective national security policy
2. The need for integrated policy for problems transcending the departments
3. Complexity of issues require a strategic integration of the instruments of power
4. To enable effective crisis management
5. The need for a logical way to apply scarce resources properly
6. The need for coordination and synchronization of the [planning]efforts of the various agencies
7. The need to iron out gaps and redundancies in the planning
8. The need to identify one strategic goal and, subsequently, the operational needs
9. The need to address all aspects of a crisis immediately, coordinately, and simultaneously
10. The need for a quicker response to a crisis

#### Intended Solutions for Interagency Coordination

1. Unity of effort or Unity of command through the NSC-system
2. To make agencies interdependable

3. To use the Political Military Planning Process, which includes: (1) clearer identification of mission and tasks, (2) one overarching strategy, (3) an accelerated planning effort, (4) an earlier implementation of civilian aspects, (5) earlier action on critical preparatory requirements, (6) a better allocation of resources, (7) a better integration of U.S. agencies involved, (8) a quicker identification of issues for senior policy makers, and (9) a better monitor mechanism to control implementation.

4. To use related management tools to the aforementioned political-military planning process, including: (1) The drafting of a political-military plan, (2) establishment of an ExComm, (3) an interagency rehearsal, (4) the use of an interagency AAR, and (5) interagency training.

5. To find ways to build and maintain interagency coordination, such as: (1) define the problem clearly and unambiguously, (2) define aims, objectives, and a strategic focus, (3) establish a common frame of reference, (4) capitalize on experience, (5) establish responsibility, and (6) direct all means towards unity of effort

6. To develop a cooperative spirit as well as mutual understanding and respect.

As stated before, these six intended solutions for interagency coordination reveal the first ideas that could be used to improve the Dutch interagency coordination. These ideas will be further developed in the answer to the next questions.

#### Comparison between the USG and the Dutch Government

The third question to be answered concerns the comparison between the USG and the Dutch Government regarding interagency coordination: What are the differences and similarities--if any--between the U.S. situation in the past and the Dutch situation at present? A comparison is necessary to determine the level of similarity between the two systems. That is an critical step in the research, because if the reasons for having an interagency process (or the reasons a government ought to have such a system) are the same, then the instruments and mechanisms (read: the aforementioned intended solutions for interagency coordination) might be useable, too.

The comparison between U.S. and Dutch Interagency Coordination (see figure 4., page 126) proved that there are many similarities between Dutch shortfalls and U.S. reasons or U.S. intended solutions. The (very few) differences could be ignored because they are not relevant for the remainder of the research and they do not affect the similarities. Considering the many similarities between the USG and the Dutch Government, it was remarkable that some of the U.S. reasons or intended solutions corresponded with more than one of the Dutch shortfalls. Obviously, some of these concepts addressed more shortfalls on the Dutch side. The U.S. concepts that proved to be most similar to the Dutch shortfalls were:

1. The National Security system (for unity of effort and unity of command).
2. The need to identify one strategic goal
3. The political military planning process
4. The management tools related to the political-military planning process (related to several shortfalls).

The ways to build and maintain (interagency) coordination (especially establishing responsibility) out of Joint Publication 3-08 was connected several times, too, but most of the ideas corresponded to the four above-mentioned concepts (especially the "one strategic goal" and "the management tools related to the political-military planning process"). Therefore, these ideas were combined with the other four for further analysis.

Knowing that the reasons behind the need for interagency coordination between the U.S. and the Netherlands are similar, then the ways to conduct interagency coordination should also be assessed for applicability in the Dutch situation. Divided into organizational, policy, and cultural aspects, the next three sections, each related to one of the secondary questions, will outline how to improve the conduct of Dutch interagency coordination. In addition to that, the "real world" comes into play in the next sections. The real world is much more capricious; those dynamics will be addressed.

## NL Shortfalls regarding interagency coordination

### Organizationally

- IWGs do not exist where they might have been expected
- Communication shortfalls occur in case of an international crisis
- Size of governmental organizations and the span of control of managers tend to grow uncontrollably
- Closer coordination between ministries is required
- Lack of training of governmental officials for interagency coordination
- The implementation of the policy is insufficiently monitored
- Coordinating officials suffer from a lack of authority of an IWG

### In terms of policy

- The Netherlands has not been able to influence international decision-making substantially
- A better tuning of several agencies' policy is required
- IWGs do not coordinate sufficiently enough
- Assessments are made separately; there is a lack of integration
- Application of policy, standards and criteria differ per ministry
- There is a lack of mandate and a clear set of rules for IWGs
- Different agencies have different objectives, goals, and endstates

### Institutional-culturally

- Difficult decisions are sometimes not made by the entire IWG
- Ministries are reluctant to use other's proven standards and policy
- Communication occurs informally rather than using formal mechanisms
- Rivalry between agencies exists occasionally
- Sometimes IWGs are used for bureau-political games

## U.S. Reasons for interagency coordination

- Need for coherent, coordinated, integrated, and effective national security policy
- Need for integrated policy for problems transcending the departments
- Complexity of issues require a strategic integration of the instruments of power
- Enable effective crisis management
- Need for a logical way to apply scarce resources properly
- Need for coordination and synchronization of the [planning] efforts of the various agencies
- Need to iron out gaps and redundancies in the planning
- Need to identify one strategic goal and, subsequently, the operational needs
- Need to address all aspects of a crisis immediately, coordinately, and simultaneously
- Need for a quicker response to a crisis

## U.S. intended solutions for interagency coordination

- Unity of effort / Unity of command (through NSC-system)
- Make agencies interdependable
- Political Military Planning Process
  - ☐ Clearer identification of mission and tasks
  - ☐ One overarching strategy
  - ☐ Accelerated planning effort
  - ☐ Earlier implementation of civilian aspects
  - ☐ Earlier action on critical preparatory requirements
  - ☐ Better allocation of resources
  - ☐ Better integration of U.S. agencies involved
  - ☐ Quicker identification of issues for senior policy makers
  - ☐ Better monitor mechanism to control implementation
- Related management tools to the pol-mil process
  - ☐ The drafting of a Pol-Mil Plan
  - ☐ Establishment of an ExComm
  - ☐ Interagency Rehearsal
  - ☐ Interagency AAR
  - ☐ Interagency Training
- Ways to build and maintain [interagency] coordination
  - ☐ Define problem clearly and unambiguously
  - ☐ Define aims, objectives and a strategic focus
  - ☐ Establish a common frame of reference
  - ☐ Capitalize on experience
  - ☐ Establish responsibility
  - ☐ Direct all means towards unity of effort
- Develop a cooperative spirit as well as mutual understanding and respect (Joint Pub 3-08)

Figure 4: Comparison U.S. and Dutch Interagency Coordination

## Organization of Interagency Coordination

The fourth question to be answered was, How does the U.S. organize its interagency coordination and what elements could be adopted by the Dutch government? For the organizational aspects of interagency coordination the U.S. almost entirely relies on the NSC-structure. The NSC has two major areas of responsibility: (1) national security and (2) interagency coordination. The second aspect is particularly important related to this thesis, but the first aspect is also relevant due to the limitation of this thesis: international affairs.

The NSC executes eight functions: (1) administration of policy, (2) coordination of policy, (3) integration of policy, (4) policy supervision, (5) adjudication of policy, (6) crisis management, (7) formulation of policy, and (8) advocacy of policy.

For the Dutch situation a similar organization would be applicable, although not all eight functions. The total of the functions (1) administration of policy, (2) coordination of policy, (3) integration of policy, and (4) crisis management would be feasible, acceptable, suitable, and adequate to address the problems in the Dutch government. These functions are applicable in the Netherlands.

The implementation of the *supervision* function would perhaps be possible. This function is without doubt needed in a governmental system. However, there is already an existing current system of checks and balances between the cabinet and the ministries and the Parliament, which would be challenged. In addition, the departments in the Dutch government have great responsibility and independence in the execution of policy. A supervisory board would be controversial.

Almost certainly not applicable to the Dutch situation are the remaining functions: (1) adjudication of policy, (2) formulation of policy, and (3) advocacy of policy. These functions may solve certain coordination problems but would not be acceptable in the Netherlands. The

Dutch system does not allow one institution--not even the Prime Minister--to have the power to superpose interagency-related policies to the other agencies.

An interesting idea is the establishment of a Dutch NSC-type of organization, a CCIA, modeled after a similar coordination center for domestic crisis, the NCC. That CCIA would be the organization to execute the above mentioned four functions. There would be two possible positions for a CCIA in the Dutch government: (1) integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or (2) in the Ministry of General Affairs (the Prime Minister's ministry). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be the most logical position, because this ministry is already the lead ministry for international affairs. Also in that disposition it would be equal to the position of the NCC in the Ministry of the Interior (for national crises). Therefore, the positioning of a CCIA would be preferable in the ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the other hand, two arguments would plead for a CCIA in the Ministry of General Affairs: (1) the impartiality of this ministry between the other ministries involved in international affairs, and (2) the fact that the Prime Minister--much more than before--acts as the Head of Government in a variety of international fora like the summits of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the expense of the influence and power of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

#### Policy for Interagency Coordination

The fifth question to be answered was, What is the U.S. policy for interagency coordination and what elements could be used by the Dutch government? In terms of policy there are three useable concepts to be taken into consideration for the Netherlands: (1) striving for unity of effort, (2) use of the political-military planning process, and (3) use of management tools related to the political military planning process.

### Unity of Effort

It is important to have unity of effort in a multi-agency environment. All means involved need to be synchronized towards the same goal. Concepts that support unity of effort are: (1) having a national strategy, which explains the national interests, (2) establishing a policy goal or objective (desired end-state), and (3) identifying aims, intents, objectives, and tasks from this objective for each of the involved agencies. These aims, et cetera, have to be nested. The nested concept is the result of a well-performed interagency analysis and planning and makes clear for each of the involved agencies what their role and responsibilities are.

Unity of effort is important because often there is no decisive authority. One agency cannot force another agency to do something. If all actors know what and why to act, then an authoritative leader is less necessary. Unity of effort and the nested concept are also useful for reducing the complexity of an operation, which makes the situation manageable. Clear intents help to anticipate situations that were unforeseen during the planning phase. Clear intents therefore provide more flexibility in a multi-agency environment.

Two things have to be born in mind. First, a plan needs to include a timeframe within which the objectives have to be achieved. This constraint works to negate mission creep or a protracted engagement. Secondly, a distinction needs to be made between short-term and long-term objectives to avoid tensions between agencies that focus on either of these two objectives.

The model that the Dutch government might want to take over consists of seven elements: (1) a National Security Strategy, which expresses national interests, employing all the DIME instruments of power, (2) one overarching political goal (the desired endstate), (3) nesting of all subsequent and underlying aims, intents and objectives, to make them supported or supportive, which creates one strategic direction, (4) objectives and tasks that are achievable and measurable, (5) intents instead of just tasks is important to create the necessary flexibility in the interagency organization, especially because there is no decisive authority to direct the variety of

agencies, (6) the identification of separate objectives and tasks for the short term and the long term that do not conflict, and (7) a timetable to keep track of the progress.

#### The Political-Military Planning Process

The political-military plan combines the plans of all agencies involved in one directive to resolve a crisis or to address a national security issue. It provides coordinating measures and identifies responsibilities. It also establishes accountability for each of the agencies. The plan and the planning process can be used to find gaps and redundancies in available resources as well as legal disconnects. The planning process facilitates the integration and coordination of civilian and military efforts to respond to a crisis. A broad range of activities are brought together, such as diplomacy, military security, humanitarian assistance, political transition, public security, intelligence collection and analysis, human rights, social reconciliation and economic restoration.

The comprehensive political-military plan consists of the following elements: (1) a situation assessment, (2) U.S. interests, (3) a mission statement, (4) objectives, (5) a desired political-military end state, (6) a concept of the operation, (7) lead agency responsibilities, (8) a transition or exit strategy, (9) an organizational concept, (10) preparatory tasks, and (10) functional element plans.

Experience with the political-military planning process in the USG has shown that the process is helpful in identifying key issues and potential pitfalls before the operation starts. Thus allowing officials to come to terms with the plan, which is preferable to sorting out roles once the actors are in the field of operations. The process also provides the necessary flexibility, which is enabled by the inherent top-down, bottom-up, and sideways communication. Flexibility allows for the plan to be modified if the policy or circumstances change.

The political-military plan could be implemented in the Netherlands, but a problem might be the feasibility of the political-military plan, because agencies in the Netherlands are considerably independent. Therefore additional regulations would be necessary (in order to make



departments work together)--for example a law--and also an independent body--the earlier mentioned CCIA--to monitor and control the interagency processes.

#### Management Tools Related to the Political-Military Planning Process

The management tools related to the political-military planning process can be seen as supporting effort to the plan. The most significant of these tools are: (1) the ExComm to provide unified planning guidance and to be responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the political-military planning process, (2) the political-military plan rehearsal to refine mission area plans, to identify problems and disconnects that could arise during execution in order to achieve unity of effort, (3) the interagency AAR to evaluate the planning and execution of the political-military plan, and (4) the interagency training to form a group of governmental officials that are trained to work in an interagency environment.

These tools are as applicable to the Dutch situation as the political-military plan itself. More difficulties can be expected from resistance in the governmental organization itself. The experience of the USG with these tools is, that there are still many shortfalls in the system. Knowing that changes in governmental processes usually require a long-term commitment, it is merely a matter of time for the culture of interagency planning to be accepted and inculcated into the broader governmental community. The more the agencies practice the process, the more comfortable they will become with it and the better the product will be. Hence, the training and the practice of interagency coordination are essential. Finally, a lack of leadership can be noticed to force this concept to be (better) accepted. Without additional measures the same obstruction could be expected in the Netherlands if the political-military plan and the related management tools would be implemented.

## Cultural Aspects of Interagency Coordination

The sixth question to be answered was, What institutional-cultural problems had the U.S. to face by introducing and executing interagency coordination? It also delineates that the problems in this area that the Dutch government might want to anticipate or have to overcome. Although no separate idea has been found, several related aspects addressed the institutional-cultural problems. This is a subject that is clearly underestimated in theory. It is therefore logical that in particular the interviewees addressed these aspects. They mentioned the following: (1) The political-military planning process is more a culture than a tool, and (2) because it is a culture, it takes time for interagency planning to be accepted and inculcated in to a broader community. Over the past few years--as the culture of interagency became more ingrained in the USG--steady improvements could be noticed.

Derived from the literature, some more specific problems within the Dutch government are:

1. Difficult decisions are sometimes not made by the entire IWG.
2. Ministries are reluctant to use other's proven standards and policies.
3. Communication occurs informally rather than using formal mechanisms.
4. Rivalry between agencies exists occasionally.
5. Sometimes IWGs are used for bureau-political games.

In this area the only two solutions provided by U.S. literature:

1. Develop a cooperative spirit as well as mutual understanding and respect.
2. Make agencies interdependable, make them rely on each other.

The institutional-cultural aspects of interagency coordination may not be the direct way to improve interagency coordination (in terms of concrete and measurable mechanisms, structures, et cetera), but they are significantly important enablers or disablers for the process.

### Final Conclusion and Recommendation

One question remains to be answered and that is the primary question, Can Dutch interagency coordination in international affairs be conducted more effectively? The answer is yes, based on the many opportunities to apply improvements. As proven in the answers to the secondary questions, these improvements can be made in the areas of organization and policy for interagency coordination. Also, improvements can be made in the institutional-cultural aspect of interagency coordination.

The recommendation, therefore, is to implement the concepts as described in this thesis because they will contribute to better performance of the government, especially in the field of international affairs. The recommended concepts are:

1. Establish a CCIA that is responsible for the administration, coordination, and integration of policies regarding international affairs, in short, establish a CCIA as an interagency "watchdog". Make this CCIA also responsible for managing the Dutch participation in solving international crises. A CCIA should preferably be positioned in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the lead ministry for international affairs. Also, the CCIA would then similarly be positioned as the NCC in the Ministry of the Interior. The NCC is responsible for interagency coordination and crisis management regarding domestic crises.

2. Adapt concepts that support unity of effort: (1) Draft a national strategy, including a clear definition of the national interests, (2) establish a policy goal (desired endstate), and (3) identify aims, intents, objectives, and tasks in order to achieve this endstate. These aims, tasks, et cetera have to be nested.

3. Use the political-military planning process and its management tools to materialize the above-mentioned unity of effort and nested concept.

In sum, much can be gained. More combined, synchronized, and focused efforts of different agencies, ministries, et cetera, would enable an operation to be conducted more

effectively and more efficiently. This would be beneficial for the Netherlands, but also for the support-receiving nation.

Secondly, improved interagency coordination at the national level would solve many problems at the operational and tactical level, or even prevent potential problems from occurring.

Thirdly, and maybe most importantly for the Netherlands as a nation, better synchronization of the instruments of power would strengthen the Dutch position in the field of international relations.

With a well-defined national strategy, clear goals, and an--interagency coordinated--plan, the Netherlands would become a better interlocutor with others. Then the effects of the Dutch contribution can be maximized and will comply with the national preferences. As the U.S. has discovered "he with the plan drives the process." This is an important observation, because it may well let the Netherlands "punch above its weight," resulting in an optimal contribution to situations where the Netherlands would otherwise simply be volunteering capacity for other nations' goals and plans. And again, that unfavorable situation has lasted long enough in the Netherlands.<sup>1</sup>

#### Further Research

Additional research is required to further develop the recommendations of this thesis. Should the Dutch Government consider these recommendations as valuable, then further research is necessary to find ways to implement these ideas.

Secondly, in the research process the analysis has been limited to the four elements of the U.S. interagency process that were revealed as potentially the most useful in solving the shortfalls of the Dutch governmental system. Additional research of the other elements like the utilization of experience of officials, the establishment of responsibility in an interagency environment, et cetera, could result in some more solutions for the Dutch shortfalls.

Thirdly, the research--as reflected in this thesis--has led to many answers. However, it has also resulted in subsequent questions. For example, the applicability of the supervision function for policies of a CCIA is not clear yet. Also, leadership issues related to the interagency process--a process that involves many semi-independent players who do not easily allow a strong and centralized leadership--need to be addressed. Further research related to these questions is therefore necessary.

Fourthly, this research considered interagency coordination between the USG and the Dutch Government. Difference in size between America and the Netherlands were not taken into account. However, the bigger the government, the harder the interagency coordination is. It, therefore, might be advisable to conduct a second comparative analysis between a smaller nation (smaller than the U.S.) and the Netherlands. For instance, the British--with a smaller governmental structure--have found that they are able to coordinate in a similar fashion, but without a formal procedure like PDD-56. The U.K. is working toward a somewhat codified method of (primarily military and diplomatic) interagency coordination. A second comparative analysis could be valuable in validating the results of the research presented in this thesis as well as adding new insights to this subject.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, the designed research model has proven to be successful in a comparison between the USG and the Dutch Government. This model could be used in other comparative analyses between two governmental systems. Such a comparison does not necessarily have to be restricted solely to the subject of interagency coordination; the model could also be used to study a wide variety of other governmental issues.

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<sup>1</sup> Dennis Skocz (Director, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State) and James McNaught (Action Officer, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State), electronic message, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

## APPENDIX A

### THE GOVERNMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS

#### Introduction

This appendix outlines the Dutch way of governing. A basic understanding is necessary to be able to make the comparison between the USG and the Dutch Government. It is also necessary to assess the outcome of this analysis, ultimately leading to conclusions and recommendations. This appendix primarily aims at the Americans, but is--to a lesser extent--also useful for the Dutch readers, because usually not many people know exactly how their government does business.

In this appendix the following five aspects will be delineated in order to provide the aforementioned basic understanding:

1. A constitutional monarchy
2. A representative democracy
3. The cabinet of ministers
4. High councils of state
5. The decentralized unitary state
6. The rule of law

A comprehensive diagram of the Dutch Government will conclude this appendix.

#### A Constitutional Monarchy

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a constitutional and hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary system of government based on the Dutch Constitution. The first Dutch Constitution was adopted in 1814 – 1815. The Netherlands has been a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system since the Constitution was radically revised in 1848. The present Constitution--the first one since 1848--came into force in 1983. The Constitution contains guiding

principles relating to the monarchy, representative democracy, the rule of law, and the decentralized unitary state, et cetera.<sup>1</sup>

The figure 5, Map of the Netherlands, shows the Netherlands, one of the three parts comprising the Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> The other parts, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, in the Caribbean, are not relevant for this thesis and therefore will not be discussed.




Figure 5: Map of the Netherlands. (Map from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)



### Monarchial Government

The Dutch government not only consists of ministers and their state secretaries (in the U.S.: under secretaries), but also of the monarch. This makes the Netherlands unusual among West European monarchies, most of which exclude the monarch from government. The Constitution sets out the division of powers between the monarch and other institutions of government. The monarch acts as Head of State and has mainly formal prerogatives. The Ministers and the Prime Minister (Cabinet of Ministers or Council of Ministers) exercise the executive power. They are accountable to Parliament for the government's actions. The monarch has no political responsibility and is not therefore accountable to Parliament.<sup>3</sup>

The monarch's many official duties include delivering the annual *Troonrede* or statement of the policy (in the U.S.: the State of the Union), which sets out the government's legislative plans for the coming parliamentary year. The monarch reads this statement (in the presence of the cabinet of ministers) at *Prinsjesdag* or the State Opening of Parliament on the third Tuesday in September before a joint session of the two Chambers of the Parliament.

The monarch also plays an important part in forming new governments. After a general election, he or she meets with the leaders of the parliamentary parties, the speakers of both Houses of Parliament, and the vice-president of the Council of State. Then, acting on their advice, the monarch appoints an *informateur* or mediator--usually a senior political figure--to find out which parties are willing to form a coalition government. After a successful mediation and based on the *informateur's* report, the monarch appoints a *formateur*; who is responsible for selecting and forming a cabinet and who usually is named prime minister after the cabinet is formed. No single party has ever achieved an overall majority in the Dutch Parliament.<sup>4</sup>

### A Representative Democracy

Legislative power is held by the Parliament. The Parliament of the Netherlands is called the *Staten-Generaal* or States-General and is composed of two chambers: (1) the Second

Chamber (or Lower House) with 150 members elected directly by the people on the basis of proportional representation and (2) the First Chamber (or Upper House) with 75 members indirectly elected by the directly elected members of the 12 provincial councils. All Dutch nationals aged 18 or older may vote and stand in elections for the Second Chamber of Parliament (with the exception of certain groups of non-resident nationals, mentally disordered, and legally incompetent persons).<sup>5</sup>

The monarch, the ministers, and Parliament all take part in the legislative process. All primary legislation has to be passed by both chambers of parliament. The Constitution prescribes that elections to both Chambers must be held every four years. Parliament may deliberate and take decisions only if more than half its members are present. Decisions are taken by majority vote.

The primacy of Parliament manifests itself in two key features of the Dutch system of government: (1) the Parliament alone ensures that legislation is compatible with the Constitution; no court is entitled to do so and (2) the government cannot govern without Parliament's support; the government has executive power but is accountable to Parliament for exercising it. Once a government has been formed, the Prime Minister makes a policy statement to the Lower House, which then votes on it. If the cabinet of ministers wins this vote, it can begin to govern. If not, Parliament may pass a motion of no confidence, after which the cabinet will resign and the monarch will dissolve Parliament and call a general election.

The two Houses of Parliament have four rights enabling them to check the power of the government:

1. The right to set a budget. The government's annual budget has to be approved by Parliament before it can be implemented. As stated before, once a year, at the State Opening of Parliament the cabinet of ministers submits--the *Troonrede*--its Finance Bill, an account of the budget for the coming year with separate chapters for each ministry. Each chapter is normally

then approved in two Acts of Parliament, one on how the ministry's revenue will be raised and the other on how it will be spent.

2. The right of interpellation. If a member of the Second Chamber wants to draw a minister's attention to a subject not on the day's agenda, he has to seek the Chamber's permission. Requests for interpellation are very rarely denied.

3. The right to put questions to ministers and state secretaries. In the First Chamber, questions are put and answered in writing. In the Second Chamber, there is a weekly *vragenuurtje* or question and answers period, during which members can put questions verbally and have them answered verbally. A minister will only refuse to answer such a question if to do so would harm the national interests.

4. The right of inquiry. Parliament may also launch inquiries independently of the government by setting up a parliamentary commission of inquiry. Such a commission has the power to require persons to appear before it and give evidence under oath. Only ministers are exempt from this requirement. Almost all of the committees as mentioned in chapter four of this thesis are examples of committees that were formed based on the right of inquiry.

In addition, the Parliament may adopt votes independently to express its opinion on a subject. Such a vote must be supported by at least five members to come to a vote. However, the cabinet is not obliged to implement it, if it is adopted by a majority of the Parliament, although a vote of no confidence will force the cabinet to resign.

The Second Chamber has two further rights relating to legislation that the First Chamber does not have:

1. The right of amendment. The Second Chamber may amend bills. (The First Chamber can only accept or reject a bill.) During the debate on the budget, for instance, the Chamber may amend or reject provisions of the Finance Bill or add provisions of its own. The minister concerned may either accept an amendment or declare it unacceptable. In the latter case, the

Chamber will then either concur or withdraw the amendment or express its dissatisfaction by a vote of no confidence.

2. The right to propose legislation. Members of the Second Chamber may also propose their own bills, either individually or in groups.

Members of the Dutch Parliament enjoy parliamentary immunity. They may not be prosecuted for anything they say in either of the Chambers, in a parliamentary committee meeting, or in a document submitted to Parliament.

### The Cabinet of Ministers

The ministers together make up the Cabinet of Ministers (or Council of Ministers), which is chaired by the Prime Minister. This type of government is not established in the U.S. The positions of Head of State (the monarch in the Dutch situation) and Prime Minister are separated. The Prime Minister and the heads of the ministries share executive power. The Ministers and Prime Minister are responsible to the legislature (the Parliament), which may oust any member, or the entire cabinet, by vote of no confidence. The Head of State or the Prime Minister in turn may dissolve the legislature.<sup>6</sup>

The Cabinet's duties include execution of the day-to-day business of government, preparing and implementing legislation, overseeing local government, and maintaining international relations. The current Dutch Cabinet has 15 ministers, responsible for: (1) General Affairs, (2) the Interior and Kingdom Relations, (3) Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities, (4) Foreign Affairs, (5) Development Cooperation, (6) Defense, (7) Economic Affairs, (8) Finance, (9) Justice, (10) Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries, (11) Education, Culture and Science, (12) Social Affairs and Employment, (13) Transport, Public Works and Water Management, (14) Health, Welfare, and Sport, and (15) Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.

The Minister for Development Cooperation and the Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities are ministers without portfolio, which means that they do not head their own ministries. The former is attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the latter to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

### High Councils of State

The Dutch Constitution provides for three High Councils of State: the Council of State, the Court of Audit, and the Office of the National Ombudsman.

The Council of State is the oldest of these three institutions. Founded by Emperor Charles V in 1531, it is still the government's chief advisory body on matters of public concern. The monarch presides this council formally, but the vice-president of the council is responsible for daily operations. The cabinet has to seek the Council of State's advice on all proposed legislation, orders in council, and votes seeking parliamentary approval for international agreements, though it is not bound to follow this advice. The Council of State may also make its own legislative and administrative proposals, and it serves as the highest administrative tribunal in the Netherlands (see The Rule of Law below). Its recommendation, if acted on by the "crown" (which means the monarch and the Cabinet of Ministers) by Royal Decree, will necessarily bear a ministerial countersignature.<sup>7</sup>

The Court of Audit oversees the government's financial management. It audits the raising and spending of public revenue by central government, individual ministries, semi-public enterprises, and legal entities partly funded by central government. The provinces, municipalities, and water boards fall outside its domain. The Court audits both the regularity and efficiency of financial management. It has three members, appointed for life, of which one is designated by the government as President. The Court of Audit reports to the Second Chamber.

The Office of the National Ombudsman was set up in 1982 to meet the demand for an independent, non-judicial body to oversee how the government deals with individual citizens.

Anyone may request the Office to investigate the conduct of a government body, and it may launch its own investigations. At the end of an investigation, the Office first sends its conclusions to the people concerned, who then have a chance to respond. Next, the Office publishes its final report stating whether--in the opinion of the Office--the public body investigated acted improperly. The final report may also make recommendations. The Second Chamber of Parliament appoints the National Ombudsman for six years. This official is entirely independent and reports to the Second Chamber once a year.

As well as these High Councils of State, the government also has access to a number of advisory bodies, of which the best known are being the Socio-Economic Council (SER) and the *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid* (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy) or WRR. In the SER the government meets with representatives of employers and employees. The SER also oversees regulatory industrial organizations such as the marketing and industry boards, and it implements some legislation, including the Works Councils Act. The WRR serves the government by supporting it scientifically. The WRR conducts scientific research on political issues, societal trends, and governmental policies and its reports are considerably influential.

### The Decentralized Unitary State

There are three tiers of government in the Netherlands: national, provincial, and municipal. National government is responsible for issues of national interest. Provinces and municipalities are tiers that deal with local government. In addition, there are water boards, responsible for local water management.<sup>8</sup>

The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces. Provincial authorities are responsible for environmental management, spatial planning, energy, social work, sport, and cultural affairs. Each provincial authority consists of a provincial council, a provincial executive, and a Sovereign's Commissioner who is appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree.

There are currently 548 municipalities in the Netherlands, though for reasons of efficiency their number will fall in the next few years, with many small municipalities being merged or else assimilated into larger ones. Municipal authorities are responsible for water supply, traffic, housing, public-authority schools, social services, health care, sport, recreation, and culture. In 1994, the government launched an urban regeneration policy, putting extra public investment into 25 cities to improve education, security, care, employment, sport, culture, and infrastructure. The position of Minister for Urban Policy has been created to coordinate this policy.

Each municipal authority consists of a *Gemeenteraad* or Municipal Council (comprised of aldermen, directly elected by the local inhabitants), the *College van Burgemeester en Wethouders* or Municipal Executive (with aldermen chosen by the Council from its members) and the *Burgemeester* or Mayor (appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree for a six-year term). The Mayor presides over both the Municipal Council and the Municipal Executive. The Municipal Council has the power to make local regulations

Municipal authorities are subject to scrutiny by the province and central government, though in practice this power is used sparingly. Municipal councils are elected directly by local residents for a four-year term. Foreign nationals legally resident in the Netherlands for at least five years are also entitled to vote in municipal elections. Nationals of EU Member States are entitled to vote in municipal elections as soon as they are resident in the Netherlands. The size of the council and the number of aldermen depend on the size of the population.

The water boards are one of the oldest democratic institutions in the Netherlands. Some date back to the Middle Ages. Water management is very important, since half the Netherlands lies below sea level. Like central government, provinces and municipalities, water boards are public-law bodies. They build and maintain dams, dikes and locks, check water flows and levels,

and maintain water quality. Property owners in their localities elect water board executive councils.

The Netherlands is changing the structure of how it governs itself. More and more powers and duties are being devolved from central government to the provinces and municipalities. The aim is to reduce bureaucracy and the distance between government and individual citizens. Urban municipalities with more than 100,000 residents may now restructure themselves to devolve some powers and duties to city districts within them, each district having its own council. Only the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam have done that up to now.

### The Rule of Law

The Constitution provides the basic principles of the rule of law. One of them is the principle that everything the government does must have its basis in Acts of Parliament. This principle also implies that courts may not apply criminal law retroactively.<sup>9</sup>

The separation of powers is another basic principle of the rule of law. It has applied in the Netherlands since the radical reform of the Constitution in 1848. One of its important manifestations is the independent judiciary. Civil and criminal justice is administered in 61 Sub-District Courts, 19 District Courts, 5 Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. Straightforward cases are heard first in the Sub-district Court, while more complicated (and all criminal) ones go directly to the District Court. Once a court has given a judgment, both the prosecutor and defense are entitled to appeal against it to a higher court. Appeals from Sub-District Courts go to the District Court, and those from District Courts go to the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court is the Netherlands' highest court for both civil and criminal cases. It comprises a president, 6 vice-presidents, and 35 justices. It has the power to quash judgments given by lower courts if the lower court has applied the law incorrectly. Its main duty is to ensure the uniform application of the law. The Supreme Court may also give judgment in cases heard in



the courts of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Case law established by the Supreme Court is an important source of law in the Netherlands. However, the Supreme Court is not a constitutional court. It does not have the power to repeal an Act of Parliament based on incompatibility with the Constitution.


One power that the Supreme Court does have is that it may refuse to apply an Act of Parliament on the grounds of incompatibility with an international treaty. The Constitution was amended in 1953 to give primacy to universally binding international law. Another amendment passed in 1956 makes universally binding provisions of international agreements directly applicable in the Netherlands without the need for Dutch legislation. The Netherlands adheres to the doctrine of monism, whereby national and international law together form a single legal order.

As well as civil and criminal courts, the Netherlands has many other judicial bodies such as administrative tribunals and military courts. Administrative law provides legal protection for the individual citizen against government. Administrative disputes are normally heard first by the administrative division of a District Court. Appeals in these cases are heard by the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State, except for social security and public service employment cases, which are heard by the Central Appeals Tribunal.

### Conclusion

The figure 6 (see next page), Government in the Netherlands – National Level, summarizes the explanation of the Dutch Government. This figure provides an overview of the most relevant institutions and mechanisms related to this thesis. In reality many more actors participate in governmental processes.

### Figure 6: Government in the Netherlands – National Level



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<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/menu.asp?Key=300111&Pad=257570,257574,257783>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?Key=302750&Pad=257570,257574>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?Key=300162&Pad=257570,257574,257783>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

<sup>4</sup> *The Europa World Year Book 2000*, Vol. 2, s.v. "The Netherlands" (Old Woking, Surrey: The Gresham Press, 2000), 2649-2651.

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?Key=300163&Pad=257570,257574,257783>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?Key=300162&Pad=257570,257574,257783>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?Key=300166&Pad=257570,257574,257783>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Government and Institutions*; available from <http://www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.asp?Key=300165&Pad=257570,257574,257783>; Internet; accessed 05 April 2001.

## APPENDIX B

### INTERVIEW

#### Introduction

Part of the research has been conducted through an interview with subject matter experts from the State Department. This interview had two intentions. First, the subject matter expert would be the source to verify, refine, or elaborate on the reasons for the US Government to issue the aforementioned policy documents. Second, the interview would also provide a current view from within the government on the needs for interagency cooperation and how interagency coordination was conducted in the real world. These two intentions shaped the questionnaire that was sent out by e-mail.

#### Questionnaire

The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part, context, described in short the substance of the thesis and the steps that had been taken until that moment. Context had to provide sufficient background for the interviewees to answer the questions that formed the second part. The questions were related to the first--draft--conclusions that were drawn based upon the research that had been conducted until that moment.

#### Context

As I wrote yesterday, I am working on a research project for my Master's degree on Interagency Coordination. More precisely: I am doing a comparative analysis between the U.S. model on interagency coordination and the Dutch model, focused on international (security) affairs. The steps I have taken so far are the following:

1. I have tried to identify shortfalls regarding interagency coordination in the Dutch governmental system in terms of--what one in America would call--national security policy.

2. I have tried to identify the reasons for the U.S. for issuing policy documents in the same field (NSA-47, PDD-56, et cetera).

3. The comparison between these two (why) questions answered the question whether the Netherlands is in the same position as the U.S. before all these policy documents existed (i.e. if so--if the reasons are the same--than some of the U.S. elements might be applicable to the Dutch situation too).

4. Next I tried to find out which of the U.S. elements for interagency coordination might be useful in the Dutch situation (the how question).

5. Based upon the answers on the why question I isolated four concepts to be investigated whether they are feasible, acceptable, adequate, and suitable or not for the Dutch governmental system. These concepts are:

a. A kind of NSC-structure to a certain extent (not all the functions are acceptable in the Dutch situation: coordination, integration and crisis management yes, policy making no)

b. Having one overarching strategy (which is the lead thought in both deliberate planning and crisis management for all agencies involved)

c. The political-military plan (with all the steps: situation assessment, U.S. interests, mission statement, et cetera)

d. Related management tools for the political-military plan (as mentioned in PDD-56), like the interagency rehearsal, interagency AAR, and interagency training

These ideas derived from the research I did so far (mainly readings). To get more insight in the practical side of the house, I have got some questions for you as a subject matter expert.

#### Questions

1. Do you see the aforementioned concepts also as the most important tools to enhance interagency coordination? Or do you see other elements as equal or even more important?

2. To what extent do you really use these tools? Have they been applied as intended in the policy or has there been some mission creep? (I ask this question to identify the difference between theory and practice, the difference between the ideal world and the real world).

3. Can you elaborate on the good parts of each of the aforementioned concepts? Also on the bad parts, the problems? Can you categorize problems to organization, policy, and culture (institutional struggles or bureau-political problems). I ask this question, because if I recommend elements of the U.S. system to be considered to implement in the Dutch governmental system, then it would be cleverer to include the U.S. lessons learned as well.

4. Are there any other relevant issues you might want to submit to me regarding interagency coordination? I ask this question because I try to be as comprehensive as possible.

If you have any question or if I explained some issues not clear enough, please send me an e-mail and I will clarify that particular matter immediately.

Finally, to conclude this e-mail, I have got one more question, Can you describe for me your position in the U.S. State Department and how much you have to do with interagency coordination?

#### Response

The questionnaire was sent to three governmental officials from the Department of State. One of the officials spread the questionnaire among relevant colleagues in the department. In total four officials responded of which three could be used for the research. The fourth official did not have enough insight in this subject to answer the questionnaire sensibly.

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